2014年12月19日 星期五
去立委翁金珠開的泰瑞薩吧， 國會立委會騙你的錢？除非政府倒了。 「泰瑞薩」之命名來自唐吉軻德， 其意為「『就是要』完成不可能的任務」， 是一家充滿理想與道德勇氣的婚嫁機構， Google一下就有了， 異性照片公開在網站可以挑的， 甚至他們名冊的個人私照，也可要求看照片， 再看自己喜不喜歡該異性提供的個照，決定要不要相親， 終身一千五，無限服務，貧戶二春殘疾都來者不拒， 泰瑞薩在做類似慈濟的慈善事業。 (北部台北古蹟蔡瑞月跳舞咖啡廳)
去立委翁金珠開的泰瑞薩吧，
國會立委會騙你的錢？除非政府倒了。
「泰瑞薩」之命名來自唐吉軻德，
其意為「『就是要』完成不可能的任務」，
是一家充滿理想與道德勇氣的婚嫁機構，
Google一下就有了，
異性照片公開在網站可以挑的，
甚至他們名冊的個人私照，也可要求看照片，
再看自己喜不喜歡該異性提供的個照，決定要不要相親，
終身一千五，無限服務，貧戶二春殘疾都來者不拒，
泰瑞薩在做類似慈濟的慈善事業。
(北部台北古蹟蔡瑞月跳舞咖啡廳)
國會立委會騙你的錢？除非政府倒了。
「泰瑞薩」之命名來自唐吉軻德，
其意為「『就是要』完成不可能的任務」，
是一家充滿理想與道德勇氣的婚嫁機構，
Google一下就有了，
異性照片公開在網站可以挑的，
甚至他們名冊的個人私照，也可要求看照片，
再看自己喜不喜歡該異性提供的個照，決定要不要相親，
終身一千五，無限服務，貧戶二春殘疾都來者不拒，
泰瑞薩在做類似慈濟的慈善事業。
(北部台北古蹟蔡瑞月跳舞咖啡廳)
http://mamajan.com.tw/index.php?node=location-taipei
http://mamajan.com.tw/index.php?node=location-taipei
大台北地區是全台灣婚友社發展最蓬勃的地區，提供著不同訴求的服務，下述的台北婚友社均沒傳出太過離譜之情事，此處的「離譜」定義在於過於頻繁的更名、過頭的收費以及收到可能有嚴重法律問題的客戶投訴。（這些資訊是非常容易從網路上找到的）。 茲將業者以服務取向分為兩類：紅娘排約型與自由點選型。業者出現次序是為了行文方便，並非推薦排序，因為每個人適合的業者均不相同。 一、紅娘排約型： 詹媽媽（總部） 在台灣，無疑的，詹媽媽在婚仲業內擁有最高的聲譽，相當低的負面評論，就網路、平面媒體、口耳相傳等所有傳播媒介予以綜合評估，詹媽媽擁有最高的知名度，也是全台灣促成最多佳侶的業者。其客層隸屬社會的中堅，在奇摩生活家未改版前，詹媽媽的台北總部得到本區最多的正面評價（已屏除業者自問自答的可能），與個人經驗相符，即便如此，年紀偏高之女性或是身高偏低之男性在詹媽媽的機會恐怕依然艱困，畢竟，這是殘酷的社會現實（這方面致電時課服便會告知）。 或許樹大招風，但該公司對於任何重傷的網路流言採取從不回應的態度，包含槍手、不實際的會員分布以及對其經營者的人身攻擊，來源包含奇摩知識家以及同業網站。 科技心醫師情 與詹媽媽總部近在咫呎的科技心醫師情，其客層定位與詹媽媽完全一致，也因此，有網友曾經來信詢問參與選擇，這不易提出完全精準的回答，因為最後服務的好壞將歸依於幫你服務的紅娘，不過，相對於詹媽媽，科技心醫師情提供了更具競爭力的價格來與詹媽媽作一市場區隔（科技心提供不到萬元但短期（一季）的方案），其企業網站內的「生活智慧王」影片詳細描述在該婚友社排約的實況。 大醫院小醫師（總部） 台灣首家由醫師創立的婚友社，原本的客層定位以醫師為主，但近年來也開始廣納不同行業的社會中堅，不過，該組織的醫師總數，在台灣依然是最多的。該公司也實行多方案的彈性收費方式，以其和詹媽媽作一區隔，此外，該公司主持人有撰一書，名為「我要當醫師娘」，對於醫師在婚姻市場的生態有詳細的描述，對於想當醫師娘的女性，有相當高的參考價值。附帶的是，近來該公司也跨足網路以及視訊交友領域，名為「愛情地鐵」
大台北地區是全台灣婚友社發展最蓬勃的地區，提供著不同訴求的服務，下述的台北婚友社均沒傳出太過離譜之情事，此處的「離譜」定義在於過於頻繁的更名、過頭的收費以及收到可能有嚴重法律問題的客戶投訴。（這些資訊是非常容易從網路上找到的）。 茲將業者以服務取向分為兩類：紅娘排約型與自由點選型。業者出現次序是為了行文方便，並非推薦排序，因為每個人適合的業者均不相同。
一、紅娘排約型：
詹媽媽（總部）
在台灣，無疑的，詹媽媽在婚仲業內擁有最高的聲譽，相當低的負面評論，就網路、平面媒體、口耳相傳等所有傳播媒介予以綜合評估，詹媽媽擁有最高的知名度，也是全台灣促成最多佳侶的業者。其客層隸屬社會的中堅，在奇摩生活家未改版前，詹媽媽的台北總部得到本區最多的正面評價（已屏除業者自問自答的可能），與個人經驗相符，即便如此，年紀偏高之女性或是身高偏低之男性在詹媽媽的機會恐怕依然艱困，畢竟，這是殘酷的社會現實（這方面致電時課服便會告知）。
詹媽媽（總部）
在台灣，無疑的，詹媽媽在婚仲業內擁有最高的聲譽，相當低的負面評論，就網路、平面媒體、口耳相傳等所有傳播媒介予以綜合評估，詹媽媽擁有最高的知名度，也是全台灣促成最多佳侶的業者。其客層隸屬社會的中堅，在奇摩生活家未改版前，詹媽媽的台北總部得到本區最多的正面評價（已屏除業者自問自答的可能），與個人經驗相符，即便如此，年紀偏高之女性或是身高偏低之男性在詹媽媽的機會恐怕依然艱困，畢竟，這是殘酷的社會現實（這方面致電時課服便會告知）。
或許樹大招風，但該公司對於任何重傷的網路流言採取從不回應的態度，包含槍手、不實際的會員分布以及對其經營者的人身攻擊，來源包含奇摩知識家以及同業網站。
科技心醫師情
與詹媽媽總部近在咫呎的科技心醫師情，其客層定位與詹媽媽完全一致，也因此，有網友曾經來信詢問參與選擇，這不易提出完全精準的回答，因為最後服務的好壞將歸依於幫你服務的紅娘，不過，相對於詹媽媽，科技心醫師情提供了更具競爭力的價格來與詹媽媽作一市場區隔（科技心提供不到萬元但短期（一季）的方案），其企業網站內的「生活智慧王」影片詳細描述在該婚友社排約的實況。
與詹媽媽總部近在咫呎的科技心醫師情，其客層定位與詹媽媽完全一致，也因此，有網友曾經來信詢問參與選擇，這不易提出完全精準的回答，因為最後服務的好壞將歸依於幫你服務的紅娘，不過，相對於詹媽媽，科技心醫師情提供了更具競爭力的價格來與詹媽媽作一市場區隔（科技心提供不到萬元但短期（一季）的方案），其企業網站內的「生活智慧王」影片詳細描述在該婚友社排約的實況。
大醫院小醫師（總部）
台灣首家由醫師創立的婚友社，原本的客層定位以醫師為主，但近年來也開始廣納不同行業的社會中堅，不過，該組織的醫師總數，在台灣依然是最多的。該公司也實行多方案的彈性收費方式，以其和詹媽媽作一區隔，此外，該公司主持人有撰一書，名為「我要當醫師娘」，對於醫師在婚姻市場的生態有詳細的描述，對於想當醫師娘的女性，有相當高的參考價值。附帶的是，近來該公司也跨足網路以及視訊交友領域，名為「愛情地鐵」
台灣首家由醫師創立的婚友社，原本的客層定位以醫師為主，但近年來也開始廣納不同行業的社會中堅，不過，該組織的醫師總數，在台灣依然是最多的。該公司也實行多方案的彈性收費方式，以其和詹媽媽作一區隔，此外，該公司主持人有撰一書，名為「我要當醫師娘」，對於醫師在婚姻市場的生態有詳細的描述，對於想當醫師娘的女性，有相當高的參考價值。附帶的是，近來該公司也跨足網路以及視訊交友領域，名為「愛情地鐵」
2014年12月13日 星期六
台電勵進餐廳 (僅此一家，別無分店!) 地址：台北市和平東路一段55巷5號 電話：02-23934780 營業時間：11:00~13:00pm，17:00pm~20:00
台電勵進餐廳 (僅此一家，別無分店!)
地址：台北市和平東路一段55巷5號
電話：02-23934780
營業時間：11:00~13:00pm，17:00pm~20:00
地址：台北市和平東路一段55巷5號
電話：02-23934780
營業時間：11:00~13:00pm，17:00pm~20:00
2014年12月8日 星期一
1. 按一下本遙控器 鍵約 5 秒→待上方紅色指示燈慢閃 2 下後鬆 開，此時紅色指示燈常亮。 2. 按一下本遙控器右上方 鍵 →上方紅色指示燈閃爍 1 下→ 鬆開 鍵。 3. 將電視遙控器頂端，對著本遙控器頂端（距離約三至六公分）， 於 5 秒內按下電視遙控器「電視開關鍵」約 5 秒→ 待上方紅色 指示燈慢閃 2 下，此時表示已學習成功→鬆開此鍵，此時紅色指 示燈常亮。 4. 再按下本遙控器 鍵→紅色指示燈滅，完成學習
1. 按一下本遙控器 鍵約 5 秒→待上方紅色指示燈慢閃 2 下後鬆
開，此時紅色指示燈常亮。
2. 按一下本遙控器右上方 鍵 →上方紅色指示燈閃爍 1 下→ 鬆開
鍵。
3. 將電視遙控器頂端，對著本遙控器頂端（距離約三至六公分），
於 5 秒內按下電視遙控器「電視開關鍵」約 5 秒→ 待上方紅色
指示燈慢閃 2 下，此時表示已學習成功→鬆開此鍵，此時紅色指
示燈常亮。
4. 再按下本遙控器 鍵→紅色指示燈滅，完成學習
開，此時紅色指示燈常亮。
2. 按一下本遙控器右上方 鍵 →上方紅色指示燈閃爍 1 下→ 鬆開
鍵。
3. 將電視遙控器頂端，對著本遙控器頂端（距離約三至六公分），
於 5 秒內按下電視遙控器「電視開關鍵」約 5 秒→ 待上方紅色
指示燈慢閃 2 下，此時表示已學習成功→鬆開此鍵，此時紅色指
示燈常亮。
4. 再按下本遙控器 鍵→紅色指示燈滅，完成學習
按遙控器的【學習】鍵，直到『機上盒遙控器』上方的紅色指示燈閃 2 次後才放開按鈕，進入『按鍵學習模式』。 注意：閃完兩次再放開，不要太早放開。 按一下欲設定的按鍵，『機上盒遙控器』上方的紅色指示燈閃 1 次後，再放開按鍵，進入『接收遙控訊號模式』。 注意：放開按鍵後，應立即按『電視遙控器』按鍵，故要先準備好『電視遙控器』。 將『電視遙控器』的頂端（紅外線發射窗口）,對準『機上盒遙控器』頂端（紅外線接收窗口），按下『電視遙控器』的按鍵，直到『機上盒遙控器』的指示燈開始閃爍，再放開『電視遙控器』的按鍵， 若紅色指示燈閃 2 次後，維持常亮狀態，表示學習成功 若紅色指示燈閃 3 次後熄滅，表示學習失敗，要重新設定。 注意：若一直在這個步驟學習失敗，兩個方法可以增加成功率：縮短兩個遙控器的距離；兩個遙控器不要呈一直線，稍微偏斜如『／ ＼』，偏離軸線的角度不要超過 45°。 按『機上盒遙控器』的【學習】鍵，完成按鍵的學習、設定。 若要再設定其它按鍵，重覆步驟 1 到 4。
- 按遙控器的【學習】鍵，直到『機上盒遙控器』上方的紅色指示燈閃 2 次後才放開按鈕，進入『按鍵學習模式』。
注意：閃完兩次再放開，不要太早放開。 - 按一下欲設定的按鍵，『機上盒遙控器』上方的紅色指示燈閃 1 次後，再放開按鍵，進入『接收遙控訊號模式』。
注意：放開按鍵後，應立即按『電視遙控器』按鍵，故要先準備好『電視遙控器』。 - 將『電視遙控器』的頂端（紅外線發射窗口）,對準『機上盒遙控器』頂端（紅外線接收窗口），按下『電視遙控器』的按鍵，直到『機上盒遙控器』的指示燈開始閃爍，再放開『電視遙控器』的按鍵，
若紅色指示燈閃 2 次後，維持常亮狀態，表示學習成功
若紅色指示燈閃 3 次後熄滅，表示學習失敗，要重新設定。
注意：若一直在這個步驟學習失敗，兩個方法可以增加成功率：縮短兩個遙控器的距離；兩個遙控器不要呈一直線，稍微偏斜如『／ ＼』，偏離軸線的角度不要超過 45°。 - 按『機上盒遙控器』的【學習】鍵，完成按鍵的學習、設定。
- 若要再設定其它按鍵，重覆步驟 1 到 4。
個人的購買大致過程(2014年02月購買) 1.一定要安裝旺信，並耐心仔細和賣家溝通！ (使用旺信，訊息會自動保留(存)) 2.結算(下單) 3.通知賣方已下單(結帳) 4.之前溝通使用運費到付，賣方將訂單的運費修改成0元 (使用運費到付，記得訂單的運費要請賣方修改成0元，以防付兩次運費) 5.確認訂單沒問題付錢去！ 6.告知賣方已付款！ 賣方使用順豐寄送… 星期五下午寄出… 下星期一早上十點收到 貨品總重1KG，運費大約$NT150元還有找！
個人的購買大致過程(2014年02月購買)
1.一定要安裝旺信，並耐心仔細和賣家溝通！
(使用旺信，訊息會自動保留(存))
2.結算(下單)
3.通知賣方已下單(結帳)
4.之前溝通使用運費到付，賣方將訂單的運費修改成0元
(使用運費到付，記得訂單的運費要請賣方修改成0元，以防付兩次運費)
5.確認訂單沒問題付錢去！
6.告知賣方已付款！
賣方使用順豐寄送…
星期五下午寄出…
下星期一早上十點收到
貨品總重1KG，運費大約$NT150元還有找！
1.一定要安裝旺信，並耐心仔細和賣家溝通！
(使用旺信，訊息會自動保留(存))
2.結算(下單)
3.通知賣方已下單(結帳)
4.之前溝通使用運費到付，賣方將訂單的運費修改成0元
(使用運費到付，記得訂單的運費要請賣方修改成0元，以防付兩次運費)
5.確認訂單沒問題付錢去！
6.告知賣方已付款！
賣方使用順豐寄送…
星期五下午寄出…
下星期一早上十點收到
貨品總重1KG，運費大約$NT150元還有找！
2014年12月7日 星期日
2014年12月5日 星期五
2014年，國民黨在臺灣地方選舉中全面失利，民進黨很可能在2016年大選中重新上台執政。 如此結果，或許對中國统一更為有利。 萬事之道，必張弛結合。 國民黨上台，大陆方讓利，外交休戰；民進黨上台，大陆方收緊優惠，外交重開戰。一松一緊，最終把臺灣的經濟版圖納入中國勢力圈，把臺灣僅剩的“國際空間”剿滅干凈，中國统一自然水到渠成。
2014年，國民黨在臺灣地方選舉中全面失利，民進黨很可能在2016年大選中重新上台執政。
如此結果，或許對中國统一更為有利。
萬事之道，必張弛結合。
國民黨上台，大陆方讓利，外交休戰；民進黨上台，大陆方收緊優惠，外交重開戰。一松一緊，最終把臺灣的經濟版圖納入中國勢力圈，把臺灣僅剩的“國際空間”剿滅干凈，中國统一自然水到渠成。
如此結果，或許對中國统一更為有利。
萬事之道，必張弛結合。
國民黨上台，大陆方讓利，外交休戰；民進黨上台，大陆方收緊優惠，外交重開戰。一松一緊，最終把臺灣的經濟版圖納入中國勢力圈，把臺灣僅剩的“國際空間”剿滅干凈，中國统一自然水到渠成。
2014年11月24日 星期一
2014年11月18日 星期二
蔣經國的國民黨 是改革創新清廉 是全球經濟奇蹟 李登輝的國民黨 是李宋黑金貪腐 是南進政策失敗(戒急用忍 對抗代替合作) 是種國民黨分家 是分化團結 使美國更能掌控台灣 (各國均有出借港口給美國駐軍 唯有臺灣蔣介石不借 還發展核武) 使日本台獨茁壯(釣魚台用心良苦) 陳水扁的民進黨 是打亂台灣制度綱紀 軍公教金融均不成體制 掏空台灣積蓄 上下貪腐歪曲體質 是屢換行政院長 朝令夕改 官不聊生 無所適從 副院長下台還自設旋轉門 吃像名流青史 是軍中買官 並大量晉昇將軍 破壞體制 且軍人不知為何而戰 有為者憤而提前辭官(世界將軍比例最高的國家) 是金融元大 新光 中國信託 中華開發等小銀行 蛇吞象併吞各數百億的大銀行 是國營企業如台電外包買電... 是集團企業如遠東SOGO 如大陸工程高鐵 如遠東ETC...
蔣經國的國民黨 是改革創新清廉 是全球經濟奇蹟
李登輝的國民黨
是李宋黑金貪腐 是南進政策失敗(戒急用忍 對抗代替合作)
是種國民黨分家 是分化團結
使美國更能掌控台灣
(各國均有出借港口給美國駐軍 唯有臺灣蔣介石不借 還發展核武)
李登輝的國民黨
是李宋黑金貪腐 是南進政策失敗(戒急用忍 對抗代替合作)
是種國民黨分家 是分化團結
使美國更能掌控台灣
(各國均有出借港口給美國駐軍 唯有臺灣蔣介石不借 還發展核武)
使日本台獨茁壯(釣魚台用心良苦)
陳水扁的民進黨 是打亂台灣制度綱紀
軍公教金融均不成體制 掏空台灣積蓄 上下貪腐歪曲體質
是屢換行政院長 朝令夕改 官不聊生 無所適從
副院長下台還自設旋轉門 吃像名流青史
是軍中買官 並大量晉昇將軍 破壞體制 且軍人不知為何而戰
有為者憤而提前辭官(世界將軍比例最高的國家)
是金融元大 新光 中國信託 中華開發等小銀行
蛇吞象併吞各數百億的大銀行
是國營企業如台電外包買電... 是集團企業如遠東SOGO 如大陸工程高鐵
如遠東ETC...
陳水扁的民進黨 是打亂台灣制度綱紀
軍公教金融均不成體制 掏空台灣積蓄 上下貪腐歪曲體質
是屢換行政院長 朝令夕改 官不聊生 無所適從
副院長下台還自設旋轉門 吃像名流青史
是軍中買官 並大量晉昇將軍 破壞體制 且軍人不知為何而戰
有為者憤而提前辭官(世界將軍比例最高的國家)
是金融元大 新光 中國信託 中華開發等小銀行
蛇吞象併吞各數百億的大銀行
是國營企業如台電外包買電... 是集團企業如遠東SOGO 如大陸工程高鐵
如遠東ETC...
2014年10月3日 星期五
2014年10月2日 星期四
松山線總長8.5公里，從松山站起共有南京三民站、台北小巨蛋站、南京復興站、松江南京站、中山站、北門站以及西門站共8站，全線車程約15分鐘。 其中包括中山站、松江南京站及南京復興站分別與信義線、中和新蘆線及文湖線交會轉乘，而西門站原本就與板南線交會；另外，松山站可經由地下通道與台鐵松山車站連接，北門站更可在未來連通機場捷運台北車站。 北捷也表示，未來松山線將與同樣是綠線的新電線銜接，採取「松山─新店」及「象山─淡水」的營運模式，捷運路網內5條路線各自獨立
松山線總長8.5公里，從松山站起共有南京三民站、台北小巨蛋站、南京復興站、松江南京站、中山站、北門站以及西門站共8站，全線車程約15分鐘。
其中包括中山站、松江南京站及南京復興站分別與信義線、中和新蘆線及文湖線交會轉乘，而西門站原本就與板南線交會；另外，松山站可經由地下通道與台鐵松山車站連接，北門站更可在未來連通機場捷運台北車站。
北捷也表示，未來松山線將與同樣是綠線的新電線銜接，採取「松山─新店」及「象山─淡水」的營運模式，捷運路網內5條路線各自獨立。
1.上了賊船，就跟賊走 2.女大十八變，越變越隨便 3.傳銷就是兔子專吃窩邊草 4.走自己的路，和愛情兵分兩路 5.是狼就煉好牙，是羊就煉好腿 6.都說姐漂亮，其實都是妝出來的 7.小鳥雖小，可它玩的卻是整個天空 8.曾經的海枯石爛，抵不過好聚好散 9.寧可去碰壁，也不要在家裡面壁 10.沒有不變的承諾，只有說不完的謊言 11. 別扯那麼遠，誰保證你能活到那一天 12. 累嗎？累就對了，舒服是留給死人的 13. 學學人家姜太公，釣的都是尋死的魚 14. 古時一劍闖蕩天下，如今一賤放蕩世界 15. 誰對我的感情能像對人民幣那樣堅定啊 16.自從買了保險，過馬路都不用看紅綠燈了 17.一覺醒來我以為我長高了，原來是被子蓋橫了 18.我們始終都在練習微笑，終於變成不敢哭的人 19.我不介意你騙我，我介意的是你的謊話騙不了我 20.你說你會等我回來，你是等了，還找了一個人一起等 21.結婚證和衛生許可證的唯一區別是，它不掛在牆上 22.在你頭上拉屎的未必是敵人，也可能是你樓上的鄰居 23.活著浪費空氣，死了浪費土地，半死不活浪費人民幣 24.牛肉麵裡沒牛肉不要抱怨，老婆餅裡面不也沒有老婆嘛 25.不經歷星期一上午的崩潰，就不知道星期五下午的可貴 26.小學生是一隊一隊，中學生是一堆一堆，大學生是一對一對 27.自從人曬黑了，臉色好看了，牙齒變白了，喝酒都不臉紅了 28.人生就像迷宮，我們用上半生找尋入口，用下半生找尋出口 29.如果你愛上了別人請別告訴我，我沒有你想像的那麼勇敢 30.壞人做一件好事叫回頭是岸，好人做一件壞事叫臨天亮尿床 31.哄領導開心就做做假，哄群眾開心就做做秀；哄自己開心就做做夢 32.結婚就是“明知山有虎，偏向虎山行”，可是'不入虎穴，焉得虎子' 33.最快變成哲學家的是老公，最快變成經濟學家的是老婆，最快變成戰略家的是丈母娘
1.上了賊船，就跟賊走
2.女大十八變，越變越隨便
3.傳銷就是兔子專吃窩邊草
4.走自己的路，和愛情 兵分兩路
5.是狼就煉好牙，是羊就煉好腿
6.都說姐漂亮，其實都是妝出來的
7.小鳥雖小，可它玩的卻是整個天空
8.曾經的海枯石爛，抵不過好聚好散
9.寧可去碰壁，也不要在家裡面壁
10.沒有不變的承諾，只有說不完的謊言
11. 別扯那麼遠，誰保證你能活到那一天
12. 累嗎？累就對了，舒服是留給死人的
13. 學學人家姜太公，釣的都是尋死的魚
14. 古時一劍闖蕩天下，如今一賤放蕩世界
15. 誰對我的感情能像對人民幣那樣堅定啊
16.自從買了保險，過馬路都不用看紅綠燈了
17.一覺醒來我以為我長高了，原來是被子蓋橫了
18.我們始終都在練習微笑，終於變成不敢哭的人
19.我不介意你騙我，我介意的是你的謊話騙不了我
20.你說你會等我回來，你是等了，還找了一個人一起等
21.結婚證和衛生許可證的唯一區別是，它不掛在牆上
22.在你頭上拉屎的未必是敵人，也可能是你樓上的鄰居
23.活著浪費空氣，死了浪費土地，半死不活浪費人民幣
24.牛肉麵裡沒牛肉不要抱怨，老婆餅裡面不也沒有老婆嘛
25.不經歷星期一上午的崩潰，就不知道星期五下午的可貴
26.小學生是一隊一隊，中學生是一堆一堆，大學生是一對一對
27.自從人曬黑了，臉色好看了，牙齒變白了，喝酒都不臉紅了
28.人生就像迷宮，我們用上半生找尋入口，用下半生找尋出口
29.如果你愛上了別人請別告訴我，我沒有你想像的那麼勇敢
30.壞人做一件好事叫回頭是岸，好人做一件壞事叫臨天亮尿床
31.哄領導開心就做做假，哄群眾開心就做做秀；哄自己開心就做做夢
32.結婚就是“明知山有虎，偏向虎山行”，可是'不入虎穴，焉得虎子'
33.最快變成哲學家的是老公，最快變成經濟學家的是老婆，最快變成戰略家的是丈母娘
2.女大十八變，越變越隨便
3.傳銷就是兔子專吃窩邊草
4.走自己的路，和愛情 兵分兩路
5.是狼就煉好牙，是羊就煉好腿
6.都說姐漂亮，其實都是妝出來的
7.小鳥雖小，可它玩的卻是整個天空
8.曾經的海枯石爛，抵不過好聚好散
9.寧可去碰壁，也不要在家裡面壁
10.沒有不變的承諾，只有說不完的謊言
11. 別扯那麼遠，誰保證你能活到那一天
12. 累嗎？累就對了，舒服是留給死人的
13. 學學人家姜太公，釣的都是尋死的魚
14. 古時一劍闖蕩天下，如今一賤放蕩世界
15. 誰對我的感情能像對人民幣那樣堅定啊
16.自從買了保險，過馬路都不用看紅綠燈了
17.一覺醒來我以為我長高了，原來是被子蓋橫了
18.我們始終都在練習微笑，終於變成不敢哭的人
19.我不介意你騙我，我介意的是你的謊話騙不了我
20.你說你會等我回來，你是等了，還找了一個人一起等
21.結婚證和衛生許可證的唯一區別是，它不掛在牆上
22.在你頭上拉屎的未必是敵人，也可能是你樓上的鄰居
23.活著浪費空氣，死了浪費土地，半死不活浪費人民幣
24.牛肉麵裡沒牛肉不要抱怨，老婆餅裡面不也沒有老婆嘛
25.不經歷星期一上午的崩潰，就不知道星期五下午的可貴
26.小學生是一隊一隊，中學生是一堆一堆，大學生是一對一對
27.自從人曬黑了，臉色好看了，牙齒變白了，喝酒都不臉紅了
28.人生就像迷宮，我們用上半生找尋入口，用下半生找尋出口
29.如果你愛上了別人請別告訴我，我沒有你想像的那麼勇敢
30.壞人做一件好事叫回頭是岸，好人做一件壞事叫臨天亮尿床
31.哄領導開心就做做假，哄群眾開心就做做秀；哄自己開心就做做夢
32.結婚就是“明知山有虎，偏向虎山行”，可是'不入虎穴，焉得虎子'
33.最快變成哲學家的是老公，最快變成經濟學家的是老婆，最快變成戰略家的是丈母娘
2014年10月1日 星期三
機場捷運先導公車共配有12輛車，每一台都有規劃行李箱，方便攜帶大型行李的旅客乘坐。尖峰時刻每20～30分鐘發車一班，離峰時刻每30～60分鐘一班次。目前廠商雖尚未明確公布正式行駛時間，但預計在10月底前就可上路服務。
機場捷運先導公車共配有12輛車，每一台都有規劃行李箱，方便攜帶大型行李的旅客乘坐。尖峰時刻每20～30分鐘發車一班，離峰時刻每30～60分鐘一班次。目前廠商雖尚未明確公布正式行駛時間，但預計在10月底前就可上路服務。
機場捷運先導公車路線由捷運徐匯中學站起站，行經捷運三和國中站、機場捷運三重站、機場捷運林口站、長庚醫院站，最終抵達桃園機場第一與第二航廈，行車時間約為80～90分鐘，發車時間為6:00～22:00，並採四段式票價計費，每段收費為15元。
機場捷運先導公車路線由捷運徐匯中學站起站，行經捷運三和國中站、機場捷運三重站、機場捷運林口站、長庚醫院站，最終抵達桃園機場第一與第二航廈，行車時間約為80～90分鐘，發車時間為6:00～22:00，並採四段式票價計費，每段收費為15元。
2014年9月28日 星期日
这是一个渔夫。河流干涸
这是一个渔夫。河流干涸
http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x23nmyx_balikci-dedigin-boyle-olur-nehri-kuruttu-sayfala-com_webcam
http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x23nmyx_balikci-dedigin-boyle-olur-nehri-kuruttu-sayfala-com_webcam
2014年9月25日 星期四
Hideo Itami vs. The Undertaker - WWE 2K14 Defeat the Streak
Hideo Itami vs. The Undertaker - WWE 2K14 Defeat the Streak
2014年9月24日 星期三
Tyler Black (Seth Rollins) vs KENTA
健太(KENTA) vs Tyler Black (Seth Rollins)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qVZB0yqS-s0
但事實就是這樣，如果寄生生物能改變蟋蟀和螞蟻的行為，為什麼寄生生物不能演化出一套方法來控制植物的行為？
事實就是這樣，如果寄生生物能改變蟋蟀和螞蟻的行為，為什麼寄生生物不能演化出一套方法來控制植物的行為？
2014年9月23日 星期二
2014年9月22日 星期一
謝醫師不平地說：「這個案子根本荒謬嘛。因為兇手自認是『拿刀子教訓』，只有『傷人』並沒有『殺人』，所以就指控害死人的是醫師。」 「更誇張的是，因為兇手已經脫產，所以死者的家屬就轉而向醫師請求民事賠償！」謝醫師越說越生氣：「天底下哪有這種道理？」 廖醫師淡淡一笑，說：「這種做法其實是很有道理的。『致人於死』是公訴罪，受理之後檢察官需要進行偵辦，告訴人不用請律師、不用找證據、更不用出庭，什麼事都不用做；另外，刑事訴訟附帶民事求償還可以免掉裁判費。既省事又省力，一毛不花，完全的以逸代勞，何樂而不為呢？」 「更何況，就算處置上完全沒有問題，很多人也都不願被官司糾纏好幾年，最後乾脆花錢消災，和解了事。你想，買彩票還要花錢，告醫生可是『免本萬利』啊！」 設計這個制度的本意絕非如此，但在有心人的操弄之下，讓訴訟已經不只是個「手段」，更是一門不折不扣的「生意」。
謝醫師不平地說：「這個案子根本荒謬嘛。因為兇手自認是『拿刀子教訓』，只有『傷人』並沒有『殺人』，所以就指控害死人的是醫師。」
「更誇張的是，因為兇手已經脫產，所以死者的家屬就轉而向醫師請求民事賠償！」謝醫師越說越生氣：「天底下哪有這種道理？」
廖醫師淡淡一笑，說：「這種做法其實是很有道理的。『致人於死』是公訴罪，受理之後檢察官需要進行偵辦，告訴人不用請律師、不用找證據、更不用出庭，什麼事都不用做；另外，刑事訴訟附帶民事求償還可以免掉裁判費。既省事又省力，一毛不花，完全的以逸代勞，何樂而不為呢？」
「更何況，就算處置上完全沒有問題，很多人也都不願被官司糾纏好幾年，最後乾脆花錢消災，和解了事。你想，買彩票還要花錢，告醫生可是『免本萬利』啊！」
設計這個制度的本意絕非如此，但在有心人的操弄之下，讓訴訟已經不只是個「手段」，更是一門不折不扣的「生意」。
2014年9月20日 星期六
哥們去ktv嗨歌〜找了小姐，買單時*發現身上没有帶足夠的現金，身上只有银行卡…… *服務的少爺說：沒關係啦，可以刷卡… *哥們說：不行！這卡是我老婆名字，我刷了~若我老婆收到你們KTV的簡訊*肯定會打死我的…… ． *服務的少爺說：没事大哥〜我們可以帮你刷成餐廳小吃消费的…… ． *此時哥們聽完之後~很開心，然後就刷了…… ． *結果剛一進到家門*老婆劈里啪啦~就是幾個大耳光！把手機簡訊給他看：牛肉麵一碗，消費19680元…… ． *你【他媽哩個Ｂ】！你去吃一碗牛肉麵*碗裡面是加了一頭牛嗎？
哥們去ktv嗨歌〜找了小姐，買單時*發現身上没有帶足夠的現金，身上只有银行卡……
*服務的少爺說：沒關係啦，可以刷卡…
*哥們說：不行！這卡是我老婆名字，我刷了~若我老婆收到你們KTV的簡訊*肯定會打死我的……
．
*服務的少爺說：没事大哥〜我們可以帮你刷成餐廳小吃消费的……
．
*此時哥們聽完之後~很開心，然後就刷了……
．
*結果剛一進到家門*老婆劈里啪啦~就是幾個大耳光！把手機簡訊給他看：牛肉麵一碗，消費19680元……
．
*你【他媽哩個Ｂ】！你去吃一碗牛肉麵*碗裡面是加了一頭牛嗎？
．
*服務的少爺說：没事大哥〜我們可以帮你刷成餐廳小吃消费的……
．
*此時哥們聽完之後~很開心，然後就刷了……
．
*結果剛一進到家門*老婆劈里啪啦~就是幾個大耳光！把手機簡訊給他看：牛肉麵一碗，消費19680元……
．
*你【他媽哩個Ｂ】！你去吃一碗牛肉麵*碗裡面是加了一頭牛嗎？
眼 - 光學錯覺https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tVgOLWVYytM
眼 - 光學錯覺
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tVgOLWVYytM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tVgOLWVYytM
2014年9月18日 星期四
為什麼加州會破產 而德州不會 一 天，加州州長和他的狗在田間小 路上慢跑。突然，一條小狼不知 從何處竄了出來，並開始攻擊州 長的狗和州長。州長開始時試圖 阻止小狼，但隨著《小鹿斑比》 電影中的鏡頭從腦海中閃過，他 意識到小狼的攻擊是其天性，因 此沒有阻止小狼，最後他的狗被 咬死，而他也被咬傷。 他 給動物控制中心打了電話。動物 控制中心派人捕獲了小狼，並給 州政府寄了賬單，其中疾病檢查 花費200美 元，小狼重新安置支出500美 元。州長還叫了獸醫，獸醫帶走 了狗的屍體，並要求政府支付200美 元疾病檢查費。州長去了醫院， 花費3500美 元進行各種防疫檢查並包紮了傷 口。 這 條慢跑道路被封閉6個 月，加州漁獵局(California Department of Fish and Game)進 行了一項調查，以確保該地區沒 有其它危險動物，調查開支為10萬 美元。 州 長在當地居民中組織了一項“防 狼宣傳計劃”，從州政府基金中 撥款5萬 美元。立法機構制定了一個200萬 美元的研究項目，目的是如何更 好地治療狂犬病以及如何在世界 上根除這種疾病。 州 長的保安因為沒有及時阻止小狼 的攻擊而被解僱。加州花費15萬 美元重新僱用並培訓一名新的特 工，並讓他接受許多特殊培訓， 比如小狼的天性。善待動物組織(Ethical Treatment of Animals)的 人對小狼的重新安置提出抗議， 並向加州起訴，要求賠償500萬 美元。 德 州州長也與他的狗在田野間慢 跑，當一隻小狼竄出來試圖攻擊 他與他的狗時，州長用政府發給 他的手槍射擊了小狼，並繼續慢 跑。 州 長這顆380口 徑的子彈的成本是50美 分。小狼的屍體被禿鷲吃掉。 朋 友，這就是為什麼加州會破產， 而德州不會破產的原因。
為什麼加州會破產 而德州不會
一 天，加州州長和他的狗在田間小 路上慢跑。突然，一條小狼不知 從何處竄了出來，並開始攻擊州 長的狗和州長。州長開始時試圖 阻止小狼，但隨著《小鹿斑比》 電影中的鏡頭從腦海中閃過，他 意識到小狼的攻擊是其天性，因 此沒有阻止小狼，最後他的狗被 咬死，而他也被咬傷。
他 給動物控制中心打了電話。動物 控制中心派人捕獲了小狼，並給 州政府寄了賬單，其中疾病檢查 花費200美 元，小狼重新安置支出500美 元。州長還叫了獸醫，獸醫帶走 了狗的屍體，並要求政府支付200美 元疾病檢查費。州長去了醫院， 花費3500美 元進行各種防疫檢查並包紮了傷 口。
這 條慢跑道路被封閉6個 月，加州漁獵局(California Department of Fish and Game)進 行了一項調查，以確保該地區沒 有其它危險動物，調查開支為10萬 美元。
州 長在當地居民中組織了一項“防 狼宣傳計劃”，從州政府基金中 撥款5萬 美元。立法機構制定了一個200萬 美元的研究項目，目的是如何更 好地治療狂犬病以及如何在世界 上根除這種疾病。
州 長的保安因為沒有及時阻止小狼 的攻擊而被解僱。加州花費15萬 美元重新僱用並培訓一名新的特 工，並讓他接受許多特殊培訓， 比如小狼的天性。善待動物組織(Ethical Treatment of Animals)的 人對小狼的重新安置提出抗議， 並向加州起訴，要求賠償500萬 美元。
德州州長也與他的狗在田野間慢 跑，當一隻小狼竄出來試圖攻擊 他與他的狗時，州長用政府發給他的手槍射擊了小狼，並繼續慢 跑。
州 長這顆380口 徑的子彈的成本是50美 分。小狼的屍體被禿鷲吃掉。
朋 友，這就是為什麼加州會破產， 而德州不會破產的原因。
他 給動物控制中心打了電話。動物 控制中心派人捕獲了小狼，並給 州政府寄了賬單，其中疾病檢查 花費200美 元，小狼重新安置支出500美 元。州長還叫了獸醫，獸醫帶走 了狗的屍體，並要求政府支付200美 元疾病檢查費。州長去了醫院， 花費3500美 元進行各種防疫檢查並包紮了傷 口。
這 條慢跑道路被封閉6個 月，加州漁獵局(California Department of Fish and Game)進 行了一項調查，以確保該地區沒 有其它危險動物，調查開支為10萬 美元。
州 長在當地居民中組織了一項“防 狼宣傳計劃”，從州政府基金中 撥款5萬 美元。立法機構制定了一個200萬 美元的研究項目，目的是如何更 好地治療狂犬病以及如何在世界 上根除這種疾病。
州 長的保安因為沒有及時阻止小狼 的攻擊而被解僱。加州花費15萬 美元重新僱用並培訓一名新的特 工，並讓他接受許多特殊培訓， 比如小狼的天性。善待動物組織(Ethical Treatment of Animals)的 人對小狼的重新安置提出抗議， 並向加州起訴，要求賠償500萬 美元。
德州州長也與他的狗在田野間慢 跑，當一隻小狼竄出來試圖攻擊 他與他的狗時，州長用政府發給他的手槍射擊了小狼，並繼續慢 跑。
州 長這顆380口 徑的子彈的成本是50美 分。小狼的屍體被禿鷲吃掉。
朋 友，這就是為什麼加州會破產， 而德州不會破產的原因。
2014年9月16日 星期二
2014年9月12日 星期五
10幅圖，看完後改變你對人生的態度...http://www.cmoney.tw/notes/note-detail.aspx?nid=12727
10幅圖，看完後改變你對人生的態度...
http://www.cmoney.tw/notes/note-detail.aspx?nid=127272014年9月6日 星期六
一輩子，一瞬間， 如果看開，多半快樂； 如果計較，多半煩惱； 如果在意，多半心累； 如果放下，多半輕鬆； 如果努力，多半獲得； 如果知足，多半幸福。
一輩子，一瞬間，
如果看開，多半快樂；
如果計較，多半煩惱；
如果在意，多半心累；
如果放下，多半輕鬆；
如果努力，多半獲得；
如果知足，多半幸福。
如果看開，多半快樂；
如果計較，多半煩惱；
如果在意，多半心累；
如果放下，多半輕鬆；
如果努力，多半獲得；
如果知足，多半幸福。
2014年9月2日 星期二
城裡公車加裝冷氣後，票價漲為兩塊錢。 一天，一個大媽上車，投了一塊錢。 司機看著她說：「兩塊啊！」 大媽點點頭說：「涼快！」 司機又說：「投兩塊！」 大媽笑著說：「不光是頭涼快，渾身都涼快！」 司機再說：「錢投兩塊！」 大媽邊往從後面擠，邊說：「後頭人少，更涼快！」 司機：「………」
城裡公車加裝冷氣後，票價漲為兩塊錢。
一天，一個大媽上車，投了一塊錢。
司機看著她說：「兩塊啊！」
大媽點點頭說：「涼快！」
司機又說：「投兩塊！」
大媽笑著說：「不光是頭涼快，渾身都涼快！」
司機再說：「錢投兩塊！」
大媽邊往從後面擠，邊說：「後頭人少，更涼快！」
司機：「………」
一天，一個大媽上車，投了一塊錢。
司機看著她說：「兩塊啊！」
大媽點點頭說：「涼快！」
司機又說：「投兩塊！」
大媽笑著說：「不光是頭涼快，渾身都涼快！」
司機再說：「錢投兩塊！」
大媽邊往從後面擠，邊說：「後頭人少，更涼快！」
司機：「………」
2014年8月30日 星期六
Minoxidil 原來使用於治療高血壓之病患,其為末稍血管括張劑,因為它有血管擴張的作用,讓頭皮的血液循環變好,毛囊重新壯大,有些有禿髮的高血壓病人頭髮再度生長
Minoxidil 原來使用於治療高血壓之病患,其為末稍血管括張劑,因為它有血管擴張的作用,讓頭皮的血液循環變好,毛囊重新壯大,有些有禿髮的高血壓病人頭髮再度生長
2014年8月29日 星期五
六福星 http://search.ruten.com.tw/search/s000.php?searchfrom=classf&c=0009000500110002&k=%A4%BB%BA%D6%ACP
六福星
http://search.ruten.com.tw/search/s000.php?searchfrom=classf&c=0009000500110002&k=%A4%BB%BA%D6%ACP
http://search.ruten.com.tw/search/s000.php?searchfrom=classf&c=0009000500110002&k=%A4%BB%BA%D6%ACP
2014年8月27日 星期三
2014年8月22日 星期五
2014年8月20日 星期三
1619 台北-中港路-台中 台中車站時刻表 ★本路線即日起配合公路總局試辦部份上下交流道、縮駛，本時刻表均依照規定動線行駛 A：台中車站-朝馬站-新竹交流道(新竹科學園區)-(中壢服務區)-台北轉運站
1619 台北-中港路-台中
台中車站時刻表
★本路線即日起配合公路總局試辦部份上下交流道、縮駛，本時刻表均依照規定動線行駛
A：台中車站-朝馬站-新竹交流道(新竹科學園區)-(中壢服務區)-台北轉運站
2014年8月16日 星期六
鞋 https://tw.buy.yahoo.com/gdsale/gdsale.asp?gdid=5317970 鞋
https://tw.buy.yahoo.com/gdsale/gdsale.asp?gdid=5317970
2014年8月14日 星期四
2014年8月13日 星期三
2014年8月11日 星期一
庭相冊是來自另一個時代塵封的時間膠囊。但是，在不久的將來，他們也可能是關鍵的文檔預測未來的遺傳性疾病。研究人員在遺傳學和分子醫學牛津大學的研究所已經開發出軟件，可以用於檢測遺傳性疾病的患兒，如唐氏和特雷徹柯林斯綜合徵的風險，只是通過掃描他們的家庭成員的老照片。 超過7000種罕見遺傳疾病是已知的，並且，雖然各不相同，因此至少有一個共同點：它們的30％至40％包含在顱骨和面部檢測的異常。牛津的項目，被稱為臨床表型面空間，建立在這方面的知識，歸併機器學習和計算機技術，掃描的家庭照片和交叉引用它們與人們已知的遺傳性疾病影像建立了一個數據庫。 臨床表型面空間識別的面孔在照片中，無論一個人的姿勢或表情，圖像質量，光照變化或其他因素。在對人的嘴角，鼻子和眼睛的項目的家庭和它們與數據庫中的照片進行比較，以預測可能的病症。這些照片可以用來與他們的長輩，甚至是死的人的照片，比較生活的孩子。那麼算法聚類的人有類似的條件下，長時間檢測可能發生疾病之前。研究人員認為，它甚至可以幫助診斷罕見的，以前未確診的疾病，如果患者聚集與別人誰擁有以前未被發現的相似之處。 新聞周刊是早在打印 對於試運行，研究人員建立了1,515健康的病人和1,363照片描述患者的8個已知的遺傳性疾病數據庫。由此產生的算法正確檢測到的面部與99.5％的精度障礙。 今天，1 7人有一種遺傳性疾病，但其中只有一小部分得到準確的臨床診斷，由於患者之間不尋常的和多樣的症狀。研究人員希望，在未來的醫生將能夠使用智能手機採取了病人的照片，並迅速運行它通過數據庫發現，如果他或她有一種遺傳性疾病。在過去的3-D成像已經被用於分析像孤獨症，精神分裂症和胎兒酒精綜合症的條件下，但此方案需要複雜的成像設備的方程完全。
家庭相冊是來自另一個時代塵封的時間膠囊。但是，在不久的將來，他們也可能是關鍵的文檔預測未來的遺傳性疾病。研究人員在遺傳學和分子醫學牛津大學的研究所已經開發出軟件，可以用於檢測遺傳性疾病的患兒，如唐氏和特雷徹柯林斯綜合徵的風險，只是通過掃描他們的家庭成員的老照片。
超過7000種罕見遺傳疾病是已知的，並且，雖然各不相同，因此至少有一個共同點：它們的30％至40％包含在顱骨和面部檢測的異常。牛津的項目，被稱為臨床表型面空間，建立在這方面的知識，歸併機器學習和計算機技術，掃描的家庭照片和交叉引用它們與人們已知的遺傳性疾病影像建立了一個數據庫。
臨床表型面空間識別的面孔在照片中，無論一個人的姿勢或表情，圖像質量，光照變化或其他因素。在對人的嘴角，鼻子和眼睛的項目的家庭和它們與數據庫中的照片進行比較，以預測可能的病症。這些照片可以用來與他們的長輩，甚至是死的人的照片，比較生活的孩子。那麼算法聚類的人有類似的條件下，長時間檢測可能發生疾病之前。研究人員認為，它甚至可以幫助診斷罕見的，以前未確診的疾病，如果患者聚集與別人誰擁有以前未被發現的相似之處。
對於試運行，研究人員建立了1,515健康的病人和1,363照片描述患者的8個已知的遺傳性疾病數據庫。由此產生的算法正確檢測到的面部與99.5％的精度障礙。
今天，1 7人有一種遺傳性疾病，但其中只有一小部分得到準確的臨床診斷，由於患者之間不尋常的和多樣的症狀。研究人員希望，在未來的醫生將能夠使用智能手機採取了病人的照片，並迅速運行它通過數據庫發現，如果他或她有一種遺傳性疾病。在過去的3-D成像已經被用於分析像孤獨症，精神分裂症和胎兒酒精綜合症的條件下，但此方案需要複雜的成像設備的方程完全。
http://technews.tw/2014/08/11/8-common-tech-myths-you-should-stop-believing-today/
http://technews.tw/2014/08/11/8-common-tech-myths-you-should-stop-believing-today/
2014年8月10日 星期日
hp 0968h pc3200(200hz) 512mb pentium 4 550 3.40 ghz socket 775
hp 0968h pc3200(200hz) ddr400 512mb pentium 4 550 3.40 ghz socket 775 ( memory 2.5gb)
pentium 4 550 3.40 ghz ------- cpu benchamrk 406
===================================
pentium 4 550 3.40 ghz ------- cpu benchamrk 406
| Intel Pentium 4 3.40GHz | Average CPU Mark |
| Description: Socket: PGA478, Clockspeed: 3.4 GHz, No of Cores: 1 (2 logical cores per physical), Max TDP: 89 W Other names: Intel(R) Pentium(R) 4 CPU 3.40GHz First Seen on Charts: Q4 2008 CPUmark/$Price: NA Overall Rank: 1566 Last Price Change: NA | 406 |
===================================
| Intel Core2 Duo E4600 @ 2.40GHz | Average CPU Mark |
| Description: Socket: LGA775, Clockspeed: 2.4 GHz, No of Cores: 2, Max TDP: 65 W Other names: Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo CPU E4600 @ 2.40GHz First Seen on Charts: Q4 2008 CPUmark/$Price: 6.99 Overall Rank: 1022 Last Price Change: $198.95 USD (2012-03-05) | 1391 |
| Intel Core2 Duo E6300 @ 1.86GHz | Average CPU Mark |
| Description: Socket: LGA775, PLGA775, Clockspeed: 1.9 GHz, No of Cores: 2, Max TDP: 65 W Other names: Intel(R) Core(TM)2 CPU 6300 @ 1.86GHz First Seen on Charts: Q4 2008 CPUmark/$Price: NA Overall Rank: 1161 Last Price Change: NA | 1120 |
2014年8月8日 星期五
【東方米蘭】樂活民族風‧黑色繡花六分燈籠褲https://tw.buy.yahoo.com/pay/payok.aspx?ordrgrp_id=85848111
【東方米蘭】樂活民族風‧黑色繡花六分燈籠褲
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2014年8月4日 星期一
教你如何從不會彈鋼琴，瞬間變成琴聖。
教你如何 從不會彈鋼琴，瞬間變成琴聖。哈哈哈!
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N2SvgCMh7yU&src_vid=OH-wJZQI0jY&feature=iv&annotation_id=annotation_2483989993
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N2SvgCMh7yU&src_vid=OH-wJZQI0jY&feature=iv&annotation_id=annotation_2483989993
Duofilm （史帝富治疣液）http://www.gsk.tw/products/medicines/Duofilm.shtml
Duofilm （史帝富治疣液）
2014年8月2日 星期六
清华教授说如果把西游记倒过来看，其实更精彩。如来派师徒四人带上八部天书和小白龙去东土大唐传教,在一路上遇到了各种妖怪,打来打去发现他们都是有后台的,无论怎么作恶都不受惩罚，八戒和沙僧觉得太黑暗了,无奈一个躲进了高老庄,一个钻进了流沙河,只有悟空坚持正义一路斩妖除魔护送师傅东去传教。 结果天庭对悟空实在忍无可忍就和如来达成协议——我们可以保证唐三藏平安到长安,不过你得把孙悟空这个刺儿头给办了,如来同意了，在一翻阴谋之下，白龙重伤坠入山涧，悟空败了，被压在了五指山下,而唐三藏却抛弃了孙悟空，孤身来到长安，在长安传完教，被封为御弟，享受完荣华富贵，寿终正寝。 就这样过了五百年,悟空终于从五指山下逃了出来,一声不吭,把天庭搅了个天翻地覆,天庭被逼无奈许诺让猪八戒化为人身，封为天蓬元帅 ，沙和尚封为卷帘大将，只要他们能够杀掉孙悟空。 最后的最后，因为兄弟相残而心灰意冷的悟空去寻找菩提祖师解惑，然后他封印了修为，如意金箍棒扔进了东海化作定海神针，回到花果山，陪着猴子猴孙过完了平凡的一生，最终在花果山的山顶化作了一块石头……这才是真正的社会。
清华教授说如果把西游记倒过来看，其实更精彩。如来派师徒四人带上八部天书和小白龙去东土大唐传教,在一路上遇到了各种妖怪,打来打去发现他们都是有后台的,无论怎么作恶都不受惩罚，八戒和沙僧觉得太黑暗了,无奈一个躲进了高老庄,一个钻进了流沙河,只有悟空坚持正义一路斩妖除魔护送师傅东去传教。
结果天庭对悟空实在忍无可忍就和如来达成协议——我们可以保证唐三藏平安到长安,不过你得把孙悟空这个刺儿头给办了,如来同意了，在一翻阴谋之下，白龙重伤坠入山涧，悟空败了，被压在了五指山下,而唐三藏却抛弃了孙悟空，孤身来到长安，在长安传完教，被封为御弟，享受完荣华富贵，寿终正寝。
就这样过了五百年,悟空终于从五指山下逃了出来,一声不吭,把天庭搅了个天翻地覆,天庭被逼无奈许诺让猪八戒化为人身，封为天蓬元帅 ，沙和尚封为卷帘大将，只要他们能够杀掉孙悟空。 最后的最后，因为兄弟相残而心灰意冷的悟空去寻找菩提祖师解惑，然后他封印了修为，如意金箍棒扔进了东海化作定海神针，回到花果山，陪着猴子猴孙过完了平凡的一生，最终在花果山的山顶化作了一块石头……这才是真正的社会。
2014年8月1日 星期五
https://v.cdn.vine.co/r/videos/E280BF081F1105730119588364288_2b6fc4de465.1.2.10578226781131231415.mp4?versionId=5PzOSg2en707.9oigUe1hqkKWWZoQlfK
https://v.cdn.vine.co/r/videos/E280BF081F1105730119588364288_2b6fc4de465.1.2.10578226781131231415.mp4?versionId=5PzOSg2en707.9oigUe1hqkKWWZoQlfK
2014年7月31日 星期四
如果能夠選擇，台灣青年 你想投胎去哪？ 一個迷途小上班族 自從陳文茜發了一篇「這個國家太對不起年輕人」之後，「對不起」成了熱門關鍵字，網路上吵成一團，到底誰該道歉，誰比較 Sorry，莫衷一是，好不熱鬧。 不管「國家對不起年輕人」或是「年輕人對不起自己」我覺得立論背後都有脈絡可尋，也確實點出了某些台灣的現實情況。 我猜想，部分文章發文者真正關心的不是國家，也不見得是年輕人，項莊舞劍意在沛公，搞些狗血煽情的東西出來灑一灑，文化大革命那路數嘛，wikipedia 查一下你就會懂的。 一嘴毛的吵了半天，最後，年輕人，你看懂了多少？又領悟了什麼？ 昨天和一位大哥閒聊，他提出一個有趣的問題： 假設你是一個台灣的 25 歲青年，在 1989 年出生時，如果有個機會，能夠選擇投胎到下列任何一個地方：台灣、香港、中國、南韓、新加坡。你會怎麼選擇？ 照今天的收入排名，你可能想投胎到新加坡。但生活在那兒，台灣視為理所當然的自由和民主就得打個折扣，看執政黨不順眼，想輪替變天？別傻了。 照競爭力排，南韓好像是個不錯的選擇。但 google 一下關鍵字「南韓 青年 困境」，你會發現，韓國工作的重點在於擠進大財團，但只有 5% 的畢業生有機會，剩下的只能接受薪水福利差一大截的中小企業，或更慘，派遣工作。收入不穩定，物價持續上升，所以「據南韓《亞洲經濟》報導，調查顯示，兩名南韓青年中就有一名在貸款償還日當天延遲繳納本金和利息。」 投胎中國？想想那些環境汙染、割喉競爭、都市人口壓力、言論管制……你確定？而且中國沒辦法上 facebook 喔！ 那麼香港如何？東方之珠，總不會錯了吧！ 昨天吃飯，和同事聊天，他說上星期小孩晚上牙痛，到了半夜，整張臉腫得像豬頭一樣，趕忙去了醫院，急診室說，我們現在馬上可以幫你 call 醫生，但醫生過來，要六千港幣出診費。同事說，小孩抱臉一直哭著說：「媽媽，牙好痛。」有選擇嗎？醫生叫來，腫成這樣也沒啥辦法，住院，打抗生素，消腫之後把牙給拔了。兩天住院，結帳付了兩萬港幣，折合台幣七萬六。 我問，為啥不去公立醫院？同桌香港人笑我傻，公立醫院醫術普通，人滿為患，除非有即時生命危險，不然就是抽號碼牌慢慢等。香港大媽說完，給我添了杯熱茶，幽幽地說：「你不知道，我們香港人多羨慕你們台灣健保啊！」 回到一開始那問題，如果能夠選擇，台灣青年，你想投胎去哪？ 台灣有很多問題，但說實話，台灣也有很多優秀的地方。重點是，我們不能只看別國好的地方，然後抱怨台灣的不足。青年失業、世代剝削、貧富差距越來越大……全世界都是這樣，不光台灣獨有。今天不管身處何處，都必須面臨同樣的困境。每個地方都有自己的美麗與哀愁，台灣也是。只想著好處，卻忽略痛苦，不過就是一場春夢、幻覺。現實不像你傻傻想得那麼簡單。 年輕人，首先你要記住，台灣，沒有那麼差。你可以不滿，台灣也絕對有進步的空間。但同時別忘了珍惜台灣的好。如果事情不盡人意，不必然就是台灣的、政府的錯。 接著。國家組成，除了政府，還有人民。我們習慣了歸咎政府，罵馬英九，千錯萬錯都是死亡之握的錯。如果政府很爛，不及格，身為一個公民的我們又能得幾分？繳稅、投票、服兵役、走路靠右邊，這樣就是好公民了嗎？ 每次投票，我們是只選藍綠，還是認真思考過候選人的政見，衡量過往表現，然後投下理性的一票？國會議長關說，我們是否向選區議員抗議，清楚表達立場，不管力量多小但都試著發揮影響力？還是覺得算了啦！哪個政治人物不關說？看馬英九吃鱉也很爽不是？ 富人錢滾錢不用交稅讓你很不爽，那麼開徵證所稅，實現公平正義這麼突破性的進展，結果導致股市下跌時，你是否堅定支持政府朝對的方向前進？還是因為持有的股票股價下跌，也開始跟著罵，都是無能的馬英九，沒事搞什麼飛機？ 「革命不是請客吃飯」。你看台灣很不爽，嘴巴喊著要改革，但你是否願意接收改變帶來的痛苦？帶來自身利益的損害？還是在心裡，其實自己的小利小益能輕易壓倒一切大是大非？ 身為公民，我們是否積極參與公共事務，推動社會改變，願意犧牲一己短期利益換來國家更長遠的發展？如果以上答案皆否，那麼我們只是不及格的公民，配上不及格的政府，剛好而已。 最後，陳文茜寫的「這個國家太對不起年輕人」以及後續千千萬萬的文章，我認為都犯了一個根本的錯誤。 在我們父母那一代，好好唸書，畢業後找個穩定的工作，25 歲結婚生子，30 歲在台北買個小公寓，穩穩當當老老實實直到退休。那是當年的黃金方程式。那個年代看電影要先唱國歌，電視打開只有三台，拍照之前要先裝底片，聯絡遠方的親友要拿起紙筆寫信貼郵票，大公司裡有很多負責打字的小姐和負責接電話的接線生。 年輕人，醒醒，看看今天的世界長什麼樣子，父母不知變通沒關係，陳文茜老大不小和時代有落差也無所謂，怎麼連青春洋溢的你也活在過去？夢想著大學畢業找份工作存三、五年錢就可以在台北買房子呢？民國六十四年第一屆大學聯考，錄取率 26.36%，文組更難考 14.98%。當年考上大學屌翻天，現在大學錄取率接近 100%，考不上才比較屌啊！ 陳文茜忘了告訴你，這個世界變了，所以生存的路徑也跟著變了。繼續用上一代的邏輯面對今天的世界，你這是拿明朝的劍斬清朝的官，很瞎啊！ 大學畢業只有 22K，學歷不值錢，學貸貴翻天。要不別唸大學了吧，高中畢業好好學個一技之長，時代不一樣，沒大學學歷有啥了不起，看看吳寶春、江振誠，你覺得誰會在乎他們有沒讀過大學？ 上班被老闆壓榨，萬物皆漲就是薪水不漲，受薪階級這麼慘，要不，自己當老闆如何？「東京著衣」兩個七年級生創業，十年拼搏，搞出了 25 億年營業額。創業難，需要大資本？擺攤賣鹽酥雞要多少成本？繼光香香雞搞到今天年營業額也破億了啊！ 套句我們這行的話說，買股票，等多頭，結果發現市場一直跌怎麼辦？沒關係，馬上平倉止損，開始放空。市場變了，時空變了，交易策略不跟著改變，績效怎麼會好？ 當然不是每個人都得立志成為海賊王，你絕對可以和吉良吉影一樣，追求平穩的生活，像植物一般的人生。生活辛苦，日子不好過，誰都需要哭夭哭爸，人之常情，這點大家都了解。 我關心的是，當靠北結束，你為國家和自己又做了什麼？ 資訊來源：塵世中一個迷途小上班族 http://cmy.tw/004P
如果能夠選擇，台灣青年 你想投胎去哪？ 一個迷途小上班族
自從陳文茜發了一篇「這個國家太對不起年輕人」之後，「對不起」成了熱門關鍵字，網路上吵成一團，到底誰該道歉，誰比較 Sorry，莫衷一是，好不熱鬧。
不管「國家對不起年輕人」或是「年輕人對不起自己」我覺得立論背後都有脈絡可尋，也確實點出了某些台灣的現實情況。
我猜想，部分文章發文者真正關心的不是國家，也不見得是年輕人，項莊舞劍意在沛公，搞些狗血煽情的東西出來灑一灑，文化大革命那路數嘛，wikipedia 查一下你就會懂的。
一嘴毛的吵了半天，最後，年輕人，你看懂了多少？又領悟了什麼？
我猜想，部分文章發文者真正關心的不是國家，也不見得是年輕人，項莊舞劍意在沛公，搞些狗血煽情的東西出來灑一灑，文化大革命那路數嘛，wikipedia 查一下你就會懂的。
一嘴毛的吵了半天，最後，年輕人，你看懂了多少？又領悟了什麼？
昨天和一位大哥閒聊，他提出一個有趣的問題：
假設你是一個台灣的 25 歲青年，在 1989 年出生時，如果有個機會，能夠選擇投胎到下列任何一個地方：台灣、香港、中國、南韓、新加坡。你會怎麼選擇？
假設你是一個台灣的 25 歲青年，在 1989 年出生時，如果有個機會，能夠選擇投胎到下列任何一個地方：台灣、香港、中國、南韓、新加坡。你會怎麼選擇？
照今天的收入排名，你可能想投胎到新加坡。但生活在那兒，台灣視為理所當然的自由和民主就得打個折扣，看執政黨不順眼，想輪替變天？別傻了。
照競爭力排，南韓好像是個不錯的選擇。但 google 一下關鍵字「南韓 青年 困境」，你會發現，韓國工作的重點在於擠進大財團，但只有 5% 的畢業生有機會，剩下的只能接受薪水福利差一大截的中小企業，或更慘，派遣工作。收入不穩定，物價持續上升，所以「據南韓《亞洲經濟》報導，調查顯示，兩名南韓青年中就有一名在貸款償還日當天延遲繳納本金和利息。」
投胎中國？想想那些環境汙染、割喉競爭、都市人口壓力、言論管制……你確定？而且中國沒辦法上 facebook 喔！
那麼香港如何？東方之珠，總不會錯了吧！
昨天吃飯，和同事聊天，他說上星期小孩晚上牙痛，到了半夜，整張臉腫得像豬頭一樣，趕忙去了醫院，急診室說，我們現在馬上可以幫你 call 醫生，但醫生過來，要六千港幣出診費。同事說，小孩抱臉一直哭著說：「媽媽，牙好痛。」有選擇嗎？醫生叫來，腫成這樣也沒啥辦法，住院，打抗生素，消腫之後把牙給拔了。兩天住院，結帳付了兩萬港幣，折合台幣七萬六。
昨天吃飯，和同事聊天，他說上星期小孩晚上牙痛，到了半夜，整張臉腫得像豬頭一樣，趕忙去了醫院，急診室說，我們現在馬上可以幫你 call 醫生，但醫生過來，要六千港幣出診費。同事說，小孩抱臉一直哭著說：「媽媽，牙好痛。」有選擇嗎？醫生叫來，腫成這樣也沒啥辦法，住院，打抗生素，消腫之後把牙給拔了。兩天住院，結帳付了兩萬港幣，折合台幣七萬六。
我問，為啥不去公立醫院？同桌香港人笑我傻，公立醫院醫術普通，人滿為患，除非有即時生命危險，不然就是抽號碼牌慢慢等。香港大媽說完，給我添了杯熱茶，幽幽地說：「你不知道，我們香港人多羨慕你們台灣健保啊！」
回到一開始那問題，如果能夠選擇，台灣青年，你想投胎去哪？
台灣有很多問題，但說實話，台灣也有很多優秀的地方。重點是，我們不能只看別國好的地方，然後抱怨台灣的不足。青年失業、世代剝削、貧富差距越來越大……全世界都是這樣，不光台灣獨有。今天不管身處何處，都必須面臨同樣的困境。每個地方都有自己的美麗與哀愁，台灣也是。只想著好處，卻忽略痛苦，不過就是一場春夢、幻覺。現實不像你傻傻想得那麼簡單。
年輕人，首先你要記住，台灣，沒有那麼差。你可以不滿，台灣也絕對有進步的空間。但同時別忘了珍惜台灣的好。如果事情不盡人意，不必然就是台灣的、政府的錯。
接著。國家組成，除了政府，還有人民。我們習慣了歸咎政府，罵馬英九，千錯萬錯都是死亡之握的錯。如果政府很爛，不及格，身為一個公民的我們又能得幾分？繳稅、投票、服兵役、走路靠右邊，這樣就是好公民了嗎？
每次投票，我們是只選藍綠，還是認真思考過候選人的政見，衡量過往表現，然後投下理性的一票？國會議長關說，我們是否向選區議員抗議，清楚表達立場，不管力量多小但都試著發揮影響力？還是覺得算了啦！哪個政治人物不關說？看馬英九吃鱉也很爽不是？
富人錢滾錢不用交稅讓你很不爽，那麼開徵證所稅，實現公平正義這麼突破性的進展，結果導致股市下跌時，你是否堅定支持政府朝對的方向前進？還是因為持有的股票股價下跌，也開始跟著罵，都是無能的馬英九，沒事搞什麼飛機？
「革命不是請客吃飯」。你看台灣很不爽，嘴巴喊著要改革，但你是否願意接收改變帶來的痛苦？帶來自身利益的損害？還是在心裡，其實自己的小利小益能輕易壓倒一切大是大非？
身為公民，我們是否積極參與公共事務，推動社會改變，願意犧牲一己短期利益換來國家更長遠的發展？如果以上答案皆否，那麼我們只是不及格的公民，配上不及格的政府，剛好而已。
身為公民，我們是否積極參與公共事務，推動社會改變，願意犧牲一己短期利益換來國家更長遠的發展？如果以上答案皆否，那麼我們只是不及格的公民，配上不及格的政府，剛好而已。
最後，陳文茜寫的「這個國家太對不起年輕人」以及後續千千萬萬的文章，我認為都犯了一個根本的錯誤。
在我們父母那一代，好好唸書，畢業後找個穩定的工作，25 歲結婚生子，30 歲在台北買個小公寓，穩穩當當老老實實直到退休。那是當年的黃金方程式。那個年代看電影要先唱國歌，電視打開只有三台，拍照之前要先裝底片，聯絡遠方的親友要拿起紙筆寫信貼郵票，大公司裡有很多負責打字的小姐和負責接電話的接線生。
年輕人，醒醒，看看今天的世界長什麼樣子，父母不知變通沒關係，陳文茜老大不小和時代有落差也無所謂，怎麼連青春洋溢的你也活在過去？夢想著大學畢業找份工作存三、五年錢就可以在台北買房子呢？民國六十四年第一屆大學聯考，錄取率 26.36%，文組更難考 14.98%。當年考上大學屌翻天，現在大學錄取率接近 100%，考不上才比較屌啊！
陳文茜忘了告訴你，這個世界變了，所以生存的路徑也跟著變了。繼續用上一代的邏輯面對今天的世界，你這是拿明朝的劍斬清朝的官，很瞎啊！
大學畢業只有 22K，學歷不值錢，學貸貴翻天。要不別唸大學了吧，高中畢業好好學個一技之長，時代不一樣，沒大學學歷有啥了不起，看看吳寶春、江振誠，你覺得誰會在乎他們有沒讀過大學？
上班被老闆壓榨，萬物皆漲就是薪水不漲，受薪階級這麼慘，要不，自己當老闆如何？「東京著衣」兩個七年級生創業，十年拼搏，搞出了 25 億年營業額。創業難，需要大資本？擺攤賣鹽酥雞要多少成本？繼光香香雞搞到今天年營業額也破億了啊！
套句我們這行的話說，買股票，等多頭，結果發現市場一直跌怎麼辦？沒關係，馬上平倉止損，開始放空。市場變了，時空變了，交易策略不跟著改變，績效怎麼會好？
當然不是每個人都得立志成為海賊王，你絕對可以和吉良吉影一樣，追求平穩的生活，像植物一般的人生。生活辛苦，日子不好過，誰都需要哭夭哭爸，人之常情，這點大家都了解。
我關心的是，當靠北結束，你為國家和自己又做了什麼？
我關心的是，當靠北結束，你為國家和自己又做了什麼？
資訊來源：塵世中一個迷途小上班族 http://cmy.tw/004P
2014年7月26日 星期六
吃兔頭火 大陸1年進口1億顆http://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20140724002171-260409
吃兔頭火 大陸1年進口1億顆
http://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20140724002171-260409
2014年7月18日 星期五
臺灣音樂館位於台北市中正區，緊鄰華山藝文特區，建築原為臺灣省政府糧食局台北管理處，建造於民國48年2月，採一般農用機構建築格局，為加強磚造二層樓房， ... 地點：台北市杭州北路26號（善導寺捷運站2號出口）
臺灣音樂館位於台北市中正區，緊鄰華山藝文特區，建築原為臺灣省
2014年7月13日 星期日
山水綠生態公園地址：臺北市南港區南深路37號。 317.gif 捷運南港展覽館站轉乘指南客運679公車於福聖宮站(山水綠生態公園)下車即可步行抵達公園。 shop_child.gif 山水綠生態公園電話：(02)2651-4865
山水綠生態公園地址：臺北市南港區南深路37號。 317.gif 捷運南港展覽館站轉乘指南客運679公車於福聖宮站(山水綠生態公園)下車即可步行抵達公園。 shop_child.gif 山水綠生態公園電話：(02)2651-4865
2014年7月12日 星期六
聰明常跟悲劇牽連，但幸福一定跟智慧有關 有些人聰明但不智慧，有些人智慧但不聰明。聰明常跟悲劇牽連，但幸福一定跟智慧有關。 人若不做事， 事不成就人； 人若不修法， 佛法不度人。 ——色拉陽智法王
聰明常跟悲劇牽連，但幸福一定跟智慧有關
有些人聰明但不智慧，有些人智慧但不聰明。聰明常跟悲劇牽連，但幸福一定跟智慧有關。
人若不做事，
事不成就人；
人若不修法，
佛法不度人。
事不成就人；
人若不修法，
佛法不度人。
——色拉陽智法王
2014年7月7日 星期一
Google 令人眼紅的十四個大福利
Google 令人眼紅的十四個大福利
https://tw.tech.yahoo.com/news/google-%E4%BB%A4%E4%BA%BA%E7%9C%BC%E7%B4%85%E7%9A%84%E5%8D%81%E5%9B%9B%E5%80%8B%E5%A4%A7%E7%A6%8F%E5%88%A9-015800110.html2014年7月5日 星期六
需要到各省各縣去分公司或經銷商或上下游廠商到處看看， 交通時間又耗掉一部分時間，我發現我的"生產力"瞬間下降許多
需要到各省各縣去分公司或經銷商或上下游廠商到處看看，
交通時間又耗掉一部分時間，我發現我的"生產力"瞬間下降許多
交通時間又耗掉一部分時間，我發現我的"生產力"瞬間下降許多
2014年6月16日 星期一
我打去台中德誼(APPLE原廠授權維修中心)問 我給他我手IMEI馬 查出來是台灣保固 之後打去台灣反應 隔天就換整新機回來了
我打去台中德誼(APPLE原廠授權維修中心)問
我給他我手IMEI馬 查出來是台灣保固
之後打去台灣反應
隔天就換整新機回來了
我給他我手IMEI馬 查出來是台灣保固
之後打去台灣反應
隔天就換整新機回來了
2014年6月15日 星期日
一位記者問一位90歲的老爺爺：老爺爺你結婚70年了，可還是每天都叫你的老伴 "親愛的" "寶貝" 這麼多年了有什麼秘訣嗎？ 老爺爺說:沒辦法20年前我就忘了她叫什麼了?我又不敢問她..只能那樣叫了... ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 一個內蒙古人到寧波吃了一碗黃魚麵，要求老闆開發票。 老闆問：“啥單位？”。 內蒙古人答：“中華人民共和國內蒙古自治區烏蘭察布市察哈爾右翼後烏蘭哈達蘇木那令格嘎查那令格村那令格二社村民委員會火山歷史文化遺址申報聯合國教育科學文化組織世界非物質文化遺產工作領導小組辦公室主任烏力圖.烏力吉吉爾格啦.巴彥爾太”！ 老闆說：麵不用錢了！ ==================================================== 北京今年高考作文题是《老规矩》，看到题目後，王小明暗自竊喜，心想幸好早有準備，于是果斷把身上的幾張百元大鈔都粘在了試卷上。
一位記者問一位90歲的老爺爺：老爺爺你結婚70年了，可還是每天都叫你的老伴 "親愛的" "寶貝" 這麼多年了有什麼秘訣嗎？
老爺爺說:沒辦法20年前我就忘了她叫什麼了?我又不敢問她..只能那樣叫了...
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
一個內蒙古人到寧波吃了一碗黃魚麵，要求老闆開發票。
老闆問：“啥單位？”。
內蒙古人答：“中華人民共和國內蒙古自治區烏蘭察布市察哈爾右翼後烏蘭哈達蘇木那令格嘎查那令格村那令格二社村民委員會火山歷史文化遺址申報聯合國教育科學文化組織世界非物質文化遺產工作領導小組辦公室主任烏力圖.烏力吉吉爾格啦.巴彥爾太”！
老闆說：麵不用錢了！
====================================================
北京今年高考作文题是《老规矩》，看到题目後，王小明暗自竊喜，心想幸好早有準備，于是果斷把身上的幾張百元大鈔都粘在了試卷上。
老爺爺說:沒辦法20年前我就忘了她叫什麼了?我又不敢問她..只能那樣叫了...
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
一個內蒙古人到寧波吃了一碗黃魚麵，要求老闆開發票。
老闆問：“啥單位？”。
內蒙古人答：“中華人民共和國內蒙古自治區烏蘭察布市察哈爾右翼後烏蘭哈達蘇木那令格嘎查那令格村那令格二社村民委員會火山歷史文化遺址申報聯合國教育科學文化組織世界非物質文化遺產工作領導小組辦公室主任烏力圖.烏力吉吉爾格啦.巴彥爾太”！
老闆說：麵不用錢了！
====================================================
北京今年高考作文题是《老规矩》，看到题目後，王小明暗自竊喜，心想幸好早有準備，于是果斷把身上的幾張百元大鈔都粘在了試卷上。
時速60跑5公里耗的油不一定就比時速30跑5公里來的高 要看車種 就像不同的船有不同的巡航速度，越接近巡航速度時會越省油 太快或太慢都會比較耗油
時速60跑5公里耗的油不一定就比時速30跑5公里來的高
要看車種
就像不同的船有不同的巡航速度，越接近巡航速度時會越省油
太快或太慢都會比較耗油
要看車種
就像不同的船有不同的巡航速度，越接近巡航速度時會越省油
太快或太慢都會比較耗油
2014年6月12日 星期四
2014年6月9日 星期一
一語道破！ 1：世界上難以 --- 自拔的，除了牙齒，還有愛情。 2 ：廢話，是人際交往的第一句話。 3 ：現實中，人們用真名講假話；虛擬中，人們用假名講真話。 4 ：生時 --- 何需久 睡， 死後 --- 自會長眠。 5 ：痛苦，本來就是清醒的人， 才能擁有的享受。 6 ：大學就是 --- 大概學學。 7 ：所謂長大，就是你知道那是什麼事； 所謂成熟，就是你知道後，故意說不知道。 8 ：感情經得起風雨，卻經不起平淡； 友情經得起平淡，卻經不起風雨。 9 ：願意留下來，跟你吵的人，才是真正愛你的人。 在乎你，才爭才吵。留下來的，是不離不棄。 10 ：謊言與誓言的區別在於：一個是聽的人 -- 當真了，一個是說的人 -- 當真了。 11 ：回憶，是通往寂寞的牢。 12 ：對自己好點，因為，一輩子 --- 不長；對身邊的人好點，因為，下輩子不一定能 --- 碰到。
一語道破！
1：世界上難以 --- 自拔的，除了牙齒，還有愛情。
2 ：廢話，是人際交往的第一句話。
3 ：現實中，人們用真名講假話；虛擬中，人們用假名講真話。
4 ：生時 --- 何需久 睡，死後 --- 自會長眠。
5 ：痛苦，本來就是清醒的人，才能擁有的享受。
6 ：大學就是 --- 大概學學。
7 ：所謂長大，就是你知道那是什麼事； 所謂成熟，就是你知道後，故意說不知道。
8 ：感情經得起風雨，卻經不起平淡； 友情經得起平淡，卻經不起風雨。
9 ：願意留下來，跟你吵的人，才是真正愛你的人。 在乎你，才爭才吵。留下來的，是不離不棄。
10 ：謊言與誓言的區別在於：一個是聽的人 -- 當真了，一個是說的人 -- 當真了。
11 ：回憶，是通往寂寞的牢。
12 ：對自己好點，因為，一輩子 --- 不長；對身邊的人好點，因為，下輩子不一定能 --- 碰到。
ㄧ天的快樂從現在開始 夫妻約定把“上床”叫“上課” 。 一日老婆發簡訊給老公：“今晚上課” 老公回訊：“有應酬 ，改自習 ！” 次日老公說要上課 ，老婆回：“不必了 ，昨晚已請家教 ！” 問：世界上最悲慘的男人是？ 答：是炮兵連的炊事兵。他戴綠帽 、背黑鍋、還只能看別人打炮 ！ 一老外來臺灣後 ，總搞不懂“鐵”和“鋼”的區別 。 某夜 ，他很晚才回家 ，結果發現房東把門反鎖了 。 老外只好大喊：“房東太太 ，把妳的鋼門打開好嗎？我進不去呀！ 老闆帶祕書出差半個月 ，回來的晚上 ，為了不讓老婆懷疑 ，親熱時很賣力 ，弄出很大的動靜！ 突然鄰居敲門怒喊：“都半個月了 ，天天這樣 ，還讓不讓人睡啊？” 老婆對老公說 ：知道為啥會遇見我嗎？因為我是仙女下凡來報你的恩。 老公看了看老婆兩眼 ，弱弱的說：妳還是回去吧！我覺得妳是來報仇的 。 老處女和老處男要結婚 ，為表示純潔 。 老處女出上聯：一條河兩座山29年沒人觀。 老處男出下聯：一桿槍兩顆彈28年沒抗戰。 橫批：今晚火拼 。
ㄧ天的快樂從現在開始
夫妻約定把“上床”叫“上課” 。
一日老婆發簡訊給老公：“今晚上課”
老公回訊：“有應酬 ，改自習 ！”
次日老公說要上課 ，老婆回：“不必了 ，昨晚已請家教 ！”
一日老婆發簡訊給老公：“今晚上課”
老公回訊：“有應酬 ，改自習 ！”
次日老公說要上課 ，老婆回：“不必了 ，昨晚已請家教 ！”
問：世界上最悲慘的男人是？
答：是炮兵連的炊事兵。他戴綠帽 、背黑鍋、還只能看別人打炮 ！
答：是炮兵連的炊事兵。他戴綠帽 、背黑鍋、還只能看別人打炮 ！
一老外來臺灣後 ，總搞不懂“鐵”和“鋼”的區別 。
某夜 ，他很晚才回家 ，結果發現房東把門反鎖了 。
老外只好大喊：“房東太太 ，把妳的鋼門打開好嗎？我進不去呀！
某夜 ，他很晚才回家 ，結果發現房東把門反鎖了 。
老外只好大喊：“房東太太 ，把妳的鋼門打開好嗎？我進不去呀！
老闆帶祕書出差半個月 ，回來的晚上 ，為了不讓老婆懷疑 ，親熱時很賣力 ，弄出很大的動靜！
突然鄰居敲門怒喊：“都半個月了 ，天天這樣 ，還讓不讓人睡啊？”
突然鄰居敲門怒喊：“都半個月了 ，天天這樣 ，還讓不讓人睡啊？”
老婆對老公說 ：知道為啥會遇見我嗎？因為我是仙女下凡來報你的恩。
老公看了看老婆兩眼 ，弱弱的說：妳還是回去吧！我覺得妳是來報仇的 。
老公看了看老婆兩眼 ，弱弱的說：妳還是回去吧！我覺得妳是來報仇的 。
老處女和老處男要結婚 ，為表示純潔 。
老處女出上聯：一條河兩座山29年沒人觀。
老處男出下聯：一桿槍兩顆彈28年沒抗戰。
橫批：今晚火拼 。
老處女出上聯：一條河兩座山29年沒人觀。
老處男出下聯：一桿槍兩顆彈28年沒抗戰。
橫批：今晚火拼 。
2014年6月8日 星期日
http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2014/04/24/a-problem-with-thomas-pikettys-wealth-tax-solution-to-r-g/
http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2014/04/24/a-problem-with-thomas-pikettys-wealth-tax-solution-to-r-g/
2014年6月5日 星期四
現在開通預付卡必須到中華電信的直營門市喔 也就是中華電信各營運處和各服務中心 一般的通訊行和便利商店不行代為開通 就算你在便利商店或通訊行買到預付卡 還是必須帶雙證件到直營門市去辦理開通
現在開通預付卡必須到中華電信的直營門市喔 也就是中華電信各營運處和各服務中心 一般的通訊行和便利商店不行代為開通 就算你在便利商店或通訊行買到預付卡 還是必須帶雙證件到直營門市去辦理開通
使用如意卡計量型上網要小心 剛才快要上網期限快到期了 撥打539要繼續申請1GB 結果因為我門號剩19天就要到期 所以就申請失敗了 必須先儲值才能申請 上如意卡網站買儲值卡 再撥打539要申請 已經來不及了 1GB連用都沒用就過期了 ::>_<:: 提醒大家 門號使用期限必須大於四個月 上網到期時才能免儲值就申請 門號使用期限小於兩個月 上網到期時必須先儲值才能申請 花180元學來的教訓 -_-|||
使用如意卡計量型上網要小心
剛才快要上網期限快到期了
撥打539要繼續申請1GB
結果因為我門號剩19天就要到期
所以就申請失敗了
必須先儲值才能申請
上 如意卡網站買儲值卡
再撥打539要申請
已經來不及了
1GB連用都沒用就過期了 ::>_<::
提醒大家
門號使用期限必須大於四個月
上網到期時才能免儲值就申請
門號使用期限小於兩個月
上網到期時必須先儲值才能申請
花180元學來的教訓 -_-|||
剛才快要上網期限快到期了
撥打539要繼續申請1GB
結果因為我門號剩19天就要到期
所以就申請失敗了
必須先儲值才能申請
上 如意卡網站買儲值卡
再撥打539要申請
已經來不及了
1GB連用都沒用就過期了 ::>_<::
提醒大家
門號使用期限必須大於四個月
上網到期時才能免儲值就申請
門號使用期限小於兩個月
上網到期時必須先儲值才能申請
花180元學來的教訓 -_-|||
貼心提醒： 539免付費專線僅供3G如意卡用戶使用，如您為2G如意卡用戶，請您攜帶相關證件至中華電信各地營運處或特約服務中心，申辦3G如意卡以及計量型上網服務 。 本服務之開通時間約15分鐘，正確開通時間仍以系統開通時間為準，本公司將以簡訊通知服務到期時間等訊息。若客戶正在使用數據連線，請關機，重開後即以本服務費率計價。 本服務僅限國內使用，各類型之開通、數據量低於30MB(含)與用罄及服務期限屆滿前一天與屆滿時，皆發送簡訊通知客戶。 本服務提供3G預付卡行動電話客戶，透過手機/筆電/遊戲機，直接將APN設定為emome以及Internet，瀏覽本公司所提供之手機網服務與網際網路。 本服務數據量用罄及服務效期屆滿，均由系統主動斷線，且無法繼續使用上網服務，讓客戶上網不超支，可以放心使用。後續再依個人用量需求申租本服務方可上網。 本服務效期60天(共1,440小時) 為服務開通後起算，於效期屆滿或數據量用畢前有效，於效期內再申租本服務，則效期將由最後一次購買日重新起算60天，並由系統主動累積國內數據量。 （例如：客戶申請國內數據100MB型後，於102/9/1 14:00:00開通，則服務效期將於102/10/31 13:59:59截止，若100MB提早於102/9/10 10:00使用完畢，則效期亦於102/9/10 10:00結束；若剩餘30MB且於102/10/15 10:00:00再次購買數據用量1GB後，則服務效期將於最近一次購買服務且開通後起算60天，故本次效期至102/12/14 9:59:59截止，剩餘數據量為1054MB） 申請本特別業務客戶，使用語音、影像電話、簡訊、影音串流 (如：影視頻道...等)、遊戲影音圖鈴下載及MMS產生通信費用時，仍須依據3G預付卡費率計收。 本服務費用僅由客戶儲值金額扣抵，不可自本公司贈送之通信金額中扣抵。 本公司行動通信網路實際上網速率會因上網地點之地形、氣候、建物遮蔽情形及所使用之終端設備、使用人數、網路系統而有所差異，客戶可至本公司網站查詢網路涵蓋情形。 如服務無法使用，請先確認您是否已開通數據服務。若尚未開通，請洽如意卡客服專線0800-080-928或如意卡直撥928轉9。 本方案申租成功後無法更改類型，亦無法辦理異動及退租；未用罄之傳輸量，客戶得至營運櫃檯申請折抵為通信費用。
貼心提醒：
- 539免付費專線僅供3G如意卡用戶使用，如您為2G如意卡用戶，請您攜帶相關證件至中華電信各地營運處或特約服務中心，申辦3G如意卡以及計量型上網服務 。
- 本服務之開通時間約15分鐘，正確開通時間仍以系統開通時間為準，本公司將以簡訊通知服務到期時間等訊息。若客戶正在使用數據連線，請關機，重開後即以本服務費率計價。
- 本服務僅限國內使用，各類型之開通、數據量低於30MB(含)與用罄及服務期限屆滿前一天與屆滿時，皆發送簡訊通知客戶。
- 本服務提供3G預付卡行動電話客戶，透過手機/筆電/遊戲機，直接將APN設定為emome以及Internet，瀏覽本公司所提供之手機網服務與網際網路。
- 本服務數據量用罄及服務效期屆滿，均由系統主動斷線，且無法繼續使用上網服務，讓客戶上網不超支，可以放心使用。後續再依個人用量需求申租本服務方可上網。
- 本服務效期60天(共1,440小時) 為服務開通後起算，於效期屆滿或數據量用畢前有效，於效期內再申租本服務，則效期將由最後一次購買日重新起算60天，並由系統主動累積國內數據量。 （例如：客戶申請國內數據100MB型後，於102/9/1 14:00:00開通，則服務效期將於102/10/31 13:59:59截止，若100MB提早於102/9/10 10:00使用完畢，則效期亦於102/9/10 10:00結束；若剩餘30MB且於102/10/15 10:00:00再次購買數據用量1GB後，則服務效期將於最近一次購買服務且開通後起算60天，故本次效期至102/12/14 9:59:59截止，剩餘數據量為1054MB）
- 申請本特別業務客戶，使用語音、影像電話、簡訊、影音串流 (如：影視頻道...等)、遊戲影音圖鈴下載及MMS產生通信費用時，仍須依據3G預付卡費率計收。
- 本服務費用僅由客戶儲值金額扣抵，不可自本公司贈送之通信金額中扣抵。
- 本公司行動通信網路實際上網速率會因上網地點之地形、氣候、建物遮蔽情形及所使用之終端設備、使用人數、網路系統而有所差異，客戶可至本公司網站查詢網路涵蓋情形。
- 如服務無法使用，請先確認您是否已開通數據服務。若尚未開通，請洽如意卡客服專線0800-080-928或如意卡直撥928轉9。
- 本方案申租成功後無法更改類型，亦無法辦理異動及退租；未用罄之傳輸量，客戶得至營運櫃檯申請折抵為通信費用。
2014年6月4日 星期三
李員於90年至95年間與妻子私下從事砂石買賣工作，93年底以妻子名義擔任負責人成立「阿亮砂石行」，因違反商業會計法，積欠營業稅、營所稅等共4千多萬元
李員於90年至95年間與妻子私下從事砂石買賣工作，93年底以妻子名義擔任負責人成立「阿亮砂石行」，因違反商業會計法，積欠營業稅、營所稅等共4千多萬元
2014年6月3日 星期二
2014年5月31日 星期六
2014年5月28日 星期三
傳說中的美軍為了幫助中方提高火炮命中率，從自己的裝備中御下“炮兵觀察儀”（原因是來不及生產），并緊急調撥連夜空運至中國的傳說更是子虛烏有，因為当时的自行火炮還沒出現,因此所謂的“炮兵觀察儀”并不存在。当时炮兵所用的瞄準具叫“指揮儀”，屬光學類儀器，每連配一個，也是進口的，經改裝后可實現與全連火炮連動（即全連火炮與指揮儀同時轉動，同時對準一個目標），以提高命中率。
傳說中的美軍為了幫助中方提高火炮命中率，從自己的裝備中御下“炮兵觀察儀”（原因是來不及生產），并緊急調撥連夜空運至中國的傳說更是子虛烏有，因為当时的自行火炮還沒出現,因此所謂的“炮兵觀察儀”并不存在。当时炮兵所用的瞄準具叫“指揮儀”，屬光學類儀器，每連配一個，也是進口的，經改裝后可實現與全連火炮連動（即全連火炮與指揮儀同時轉動，同時對準一個目標），以提高命中率。
2014年5月27日 星期二
在這邊買了台電P78HD及X98 3G均是在語言與輸入設定內 直接設定繁體中文，就顯示中文（台灣） 且都內建Google play, 在平板這一塊可能不需要太多考慮 電信商，所以都做國際通用的。
在這邊買了台電P78HD及X98 3G均是在語言與輸入設定內
直接設定繁體中文，就顯示中文（台灣）
且都內建Google play, 在平板這一塊可能不需要太多考慮電信商，所以都做國際通用的。
直接設定繁體中文，就顯示中文（台灣）
且都內建Google play, 在平板這一塊可能不需要太多考慮電信商，所以都做國際通用的。
2014年5月25日 星期日
2014年5月21日 星期三
酷派大神採用 7 英吋大螢幕，搭載 1.7GHz 八核心處理器，2GB 的 RAM，8GB 的 ROM，支援 2TB 的外擴儲存，1300 萬畫素主鏡頭頭、500 萬畫素前置鏡頭，4000mAh 電池容量，GSM/WCDMA 雙卡雙待設計，採用 Android4.2.2 的 Emotion UI 2.0。酷派大神將於 1 月 15 日開始第二輪預售，1 月 23日 開啟第二輪搶購。
酷派大神採用 7 英吋大螢幕，搭載 1.7GHz 八核心處理器，2GB 的 RAM，8GB 的 ROM，支援 2TB 的外擴儲存，1300 萬畫素主鏡頭頭、500 萬畫素前置鏡頭，4000mAh 電池容量，GSM/WCDMA 雙卡雙待設計，採用 Android4.2.2 的 Emotion UI 2.0。酷派大神將於 1 月 15 日開始第二輪預售，1 月 23日 開啟第二輪搶購。
2014年5月20日 星期二
2014年5月15日 星期四
Teddy Hsieh PS 191D Prof. Tong 1 June 2013 US Federal Agencies and China The Research Project China’s rise as a new power has prompted many questions about how America should approach it in the 21st century. China has recently become the world’s 2nd largest economy in terms of Gross Domestic Product (PPP) as well as the world’s largest trading economy, and the US has taken several steps to engage a rising China to ensure amiable bilateral relations as well as China’s cooperation within the international community. While many scholars are interested in America’s national response to China’s rise, none have investigated the US’s response at the federal department and agency level. This research project compared the responses of US Federal Government Departments to the rise of China, which includes all Cabinet level agencies and their relevant sub-agencies. Specifically, the project examines these questions: 1) What US federal government agencies have China related activities? 2) What do these activities entail? 3) What has been the development of these interactions with China in the past 10 years (2002-2012)? This topic is intended to show what the American government specifically does in its relations with China at the federal level, and to investigate to what extent the departments have worked in a multi-agency cooperative effort to interact with China or if they have preferred unilateral approaches instead. And while the general public tends to perceive US-China relations as simply dialogues between leaders, this research allows for the examination of how foreign policy is created and implemented by individual governmental units through specific acts of engagement. Temporal-Spatial Domain For this project I conducted my research within the time frame of 2002-2012, particularly because many of the departments and agencies I investigated have only begun extensive interactions with China in the last 10 years. The study focused entirely on American departments at the federal level interacting in China, which includes official travels to China, signed agreements, permanent presence in China, cooperative projects or meetings with Chinese government officials or joint programs with other agencies in China. Departments are defined as government bodies in the executive branch that are authorized by Congress, each headed by a Secretary that advises the US president in his Cabinet and generally handle large policy issues. Executive agencies are more specifically designed to implement tasks, most of which are created and managed by the departments. Because of this, activities conducted by agencies on behalf of their respective departments will be considered department actions. The project investigated all 15 cabinet-level departments at the national level and their relevant sub-agencies to see which governmental bodies meet the criteria of having China-related activities. The US Departments include: Agriculture Commerce Defense Education Energy Health and Human Services Homeland Security Justice Labor State Transportation Treasury Methods and Data Sources In order to collect the information I needed regarding the activities of federal departments in China, I explored several kinds of websites as my sources, recording what I found on Excel spreadsheets. See Appendices for the results of this investigation. The primary type of website I used was the official government websites of each department, taking several steps to thoroughly search for information. For example, for the State Department I used www.state.gov, and the first section I would look for is any label related to official travel by the department’s top leaders. If the website did not contain a “travel” section on their website, I would look into the press releases and fact sheets archives for evidence if travels occurred at all. I also looked for sections related to offices or posts in China, such as links for the US embassy or another overseas office. I would also look for possible sub-agency tabs related to international affairs or foreign affairs that specifically addressed China; in the case of the State Department, this was the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Within their news archives, if possible I would set the search parameters to January 1st to December 31st of each year and search using the words “China”, “China relations”, and “China visit” in order to better organize the results by year. Next, I would look through the titles of each of the resulting publications and read through each article to determine if any of the publications met my criteria for Chinese-related activities. No website was perfect in their arrangement and design, nor were the publications completely extensive. For instance, the Treasury and Defense Departments’ websites were very well designed in making information easily accessible, with specific tabs and parameters that could be used to narrow searches. However, sometimes there were incomplete sections, where only one year was publicly listed and the information from other years would have to be found through archive searches. Other websites simply lacked search parameters and I had to look through all of the documents relating to or containing the word “China” in order to find where 2002 began. There were also several occasions when the link for the article simply did not work because the file was either corrupted or no longer existed in the system. In terms of inconsistencies, articles for some annual programs such as the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade were available for some years but missing for others. In order to fulfill some of these inconsistencies or missing proof of these events having taken place, I would use news websites that mentioned the missing event through Google searches to supplement the data I had already found. This was particularly helpful when a newspaper such as the Chinese People’s Daily Online provided an article featuring an event that the government websites had no information on. Otherwise American newspapers such as the New York Times also provided proof that these events happened. The Data Official Travels to China The first category I searched for was official travels to China by each of the departments. Travels by government officials to China might involve visitations for annual forums, negotiations over bilateral issues, consultations for multilateral meetings such as the Six-Party Talks, or even for community relations. These visits are important because they not only convey the recognition of another country’s sovereignty, but they are also a tangible means of face-to-face diplomacy by which two countries can strengthen ties with one another. For this study I counted every travel by any government official that was recorded in an official press release, publication or fact sheet from the archives of each government website. As long as there was an official article to prove that a visitation occurred, it was counted in this study. If it was clear that a visit should have occurred but there was no corresponding article, I would first search articles published after the visit to see if it was mentioned as a previous event. If not, then I would search news articles to see if they had any pertinent articles. Finally, if neither option were successful, I would count the visit anyway and make a note in my data if there was missing proof. In this category I expected that travels to China would increase over time as the American government became more involved in bilateral relations. Figure 1a shows the total number of visits that each department made to China during the years 2002 to 2012, and Figure 1b represents what each department contributed to the overall number of visits as a percentage. Unsurprisingly, the State Department dwarfs the other departments with a total of 67 visits out of a combined 174 to China. This is an expected result because the State Department is designed to be the official foreign relations arm of the United States, advancing the nation’s interests through the implementation of US foreign policy and diplomacy with other countries. Naturally, this would require the State Department to be more active abroad than other departments, especially if it is primarily tasked with meeting with foreign leaders and representing US interests. What is surprising is that the Justice Department had travels to China at all, considering it only included two visits from two Attorney-Generals that encouraged future cooperation in law enforcement. Figure 2 shows the total number of visits all the departments made to China per year. The year 2008 is demonstrably the period of the most visits to China, while 2004 was the period of the least amount of visits. The years of 2006-2008 show a rapid increase in visits, which was most likely caused by the occurrence of the Six-Party Talks during those years. The Six-Party Talks were a series of multi-lateral meetings in which the US, China, North Korea, Japan, South Korea and Russia met to discuss resolutions in the wake of North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. After the meetings were canceled by North Korea’s failed satellite launch in 2009, there is a noticeable drop in visits, but this is followed by another increasing trend during the years 2009-2011. This latter trend could possibly be explained by the increased involvement in cooperative forums such as the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, China’s rise as the second largest economy in the world as of 2010 and Obama’s subsequent Pivot Policy, as well as additional North Korean aggression in the Korean Peninsula in 2010. Another possible factor could be the shuffling of the presidential cabinet as Obama took office after the 2008 election. It may have taken his cabinet secretaries time to settle into their new positions and subsequently this may have delayed the new cabinet’s outreach to China. Figure 2 does not present a clear pattern of China visits by federal departments. While the visits have been consistently greater than 10 visits after 2005, the amount of visits per year do not show a strong increase over the time period. Agreements with China The second category I searched for was bilateral agreements made between US Departments and Chinese government agencies. The agreements took the form of Memoranda of Understandings, Letters of Intent, Agreements, Guidelines, Letters of Understanding, etc. The purpose of these agreements is to create beneficial frameworks where both parties may have room to achieve mutual goals. Though they do not have legally binding powers, they are more flexible than contracts and are more formal than verbal agreements. These agreements are not considered to be at the level of treaties, and therefore do not need Senate approval through ratification. I chose to record signed agreements because they are publicly announced as seen in articles, are more accountable than verbal agreements, and there have been no formal bilateral treaties with China since the Mutual Defense Treaty with the pre-communist government. It is important to understand the occurrence of these agreements because it is a means by which the US and China can improve their relations with one another through cooperative measures. For this study, any signed agreement titled in a similar manner to what was mentioned in the above paragraph was counted as long as there was a publication that proved the agreement occurred at all. On multiple occasions some department websites provided information on the agreements of other departments, such as the Treasury Department website showing an agreement made between the Transportation Department and its Chinese counterpart despite the Transportation Department’s lack of a relevant article in its own database. Figure 3a shows the number of agreements that each department had with China in the course of 2002-2012, and Figure 3b shows the contribution of each department to the total amount of agreements as a percentage. It can be seen that the Energy Department has the most number of agreements made with China, followed by Agriculture and Commerce. The dominance of the Energy Department, with 42 out of 126 combined agreements, might be explained by America’s recent turn towards alternative energy sources, as stipulated by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. Moreover, as China began pursuing renewable energy sources with its Renewable Energy Law in 2006, it is no surprise that the US would seek to engage one of the largest polluters on Earth in addition to itself. The Defense, Homeland Security and Justice Departments all have the least amount of agreements. The Defense Department only has agreements regarding the investigation of past POW’s and still missing personnel from past wars, and it is unlikely that the armed forces of the two countries would be eligible to negotiate agreements besides minor issues dealing with history without the Defense Secretary or other upper echelon leaders. The Homeland Security Department is mostly concerned with US national security, and while cooperation with its Chinese counterpart may be beneficial, formalized agreements are probably unnecessary given the Department’s emphasis on the domestic sphere. Finally, the Justice Department is largely concerned with domestic crimes and infractions of the law, so agreements with their Chinese counterparts would be unlikely as well. Figure 4 shows the total number of agreements made per year. There is a peak of agreements in the year 2009, but after that year there is a noticeable decrease in signed agreements, with 2012 having the least amount. For several of the departments, there is a surprising lack of data for the year 2012. For example, in the Agriculture Department there were generally more than two agreements per year, except 2012 which yields no data at all. It is also interesting to note that the three years before were consecutively increasing from two agreements to four agreements in 2011. Similarly, despite having four or more agreements in 2010 or 2011, the Commerce and Energy Departments also had significant drops to one or no agreements at all. One possible explanation for the decrease from 2009 to 2012 may be that US federal departments may have spent more time interacting with other countries as a result of Obama’s first term and the later introduction of his “Pivot” policy. Another explanation may be that the departments may have already addressed most policy areas of concern to both countries during the years prior to 2012, and thus there may have been no need for new agreements or the renewing of any agreements. Though the number of agreements made per year beginning from 2002 was consistently greater than five until 2012, the data again presents no clear pattern of increase regarding departmental activity with China. Offices and Posts The third category I investigated focused on how many permanent offices or posts (if any) that the departments had in China. These overseas positions allow each agency to have a presence in China in order to monitor their specific policy areas as well as relations with their Chinese counterparts. For example, the Department of Agriculture has Agricultural Trade Offices in Beijing as well as in four other major cities in order to monitor and report on agricultural trade reports in different parts of China. Likewise, the Commerce Department’s Commercial Service has many regional offices throughout the country that provide custom regional support for US businesses to start and expand trade in China. The offices themselves are usually located within the US Embassy or Consulates in the major cities, sharing the building location with other agencies. In order to determine if an agency had an overseas office or post, I searched each government website for its “office” section. If there was no such explicit section, I used the website’s search engine with “China office” to find the appropriate links. I did not record the years that the offices were established because some were founded in years not included in this study and some positions do not have date information. Like the agreements category, some websites provided multiple links for several different agency offices in one location, such as the US Embassy in Beijing website, which allowed me to record the offices of Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland Security, and Energy. Some posts such as the full-time epidemiologist for the Department of Health and Human Services were more obscure and were sometimes mentioned as a part of articles related to activities in China. Figure 5 shows the number of offices or posts that each department has in China. The Commerce Department has the most offices with 20 out of a total of 49 offices, which highlights the importance of the economic relationship between the US and China. The Defense, Education, Labor, Transportation and Treasury Departments have no offices at all. The Defense Department does not have a permanent presence in China because that would amount to constructing a military base which would be considered a violation of China’s sovereignty. The other four departments probably do not have any offices because there is no need to monitor or report conditions related to their policy areas in China. The only office that the Energy Department has is located in Beijing. The Commerce Department has the most offices most likely because it is trying to maximize its coverage of China’s diverse industries throughout the country. In comparison to agriculture, trade is much more varied in scope than agricultural trade because the latter is more specific in its industry. The State Department’s Embassy and Consulates are located in major cities in order to help American citizens as well as facilitate travel and business for Chinese citizens wishing to conduct activity in the US, while their Virtual Presence Posts are in relatively minor cities. Figure 6 shows the number of US offices and posts located in each Chinese city known to have them. It is reasonable that Beijing should have the most amount of offices as well as the most amount of departments involved given that it is China’s capital city. For the departments to have offices in major cities such as Guangzhou, Hong Kong, Shanghai and Shenyang is also reasonable because of their importance as major industrial, trade and technological centers. The rest of the cities listed with single offices are most likely a part of the Commerce Department’s desire to involve itself in as many trade centers as possible in order to support the expansion of US business in China. While the data does not show a particular trend regarding the creation of new offices over time, it does show that these offices and posts are widespread throughout China and not solely concentrated in the capital and major cities. Greater involvement by American departments in Chinese cities through improved diplomatic and commercial ties may encourage increased numbers of permanent offices in the future, especially as the Commerce Department has already expanded to smaller cities. Projects and Activities The fourth category of this study examines the development of departmental projects and activities in China. This includes cooperative projects, forums, community relations, exchanges and dialogues. The purpose of these activities is to enhance cooperation and improve ties between the departments and their Chinese counterparts, as well as facilitate collaborative efforts to accomplish common interests. By recording the development of projects and activities of various departments over 2002-2012, I hoped to find evidence that the US government was becoming increasingly more involved with China. In researching this category, I was surprised to find that some departments had extensive community relations projects. For example, the Defense Department has sent Army bands to China to participate in joint concerts, Navy sailors to visit orphanages, middle schools and centers for the disabled and elderly, and Air Force medical technicians to help train their Chinese counterparts. For this category I searched press release and fact sheet archives and newspaper archives if necessary, with most of the pertinent documents the same as the ones used for the official travels section. This was helpful because each of these documents explained why the department official was visiting China, allowing me to record and track their travels and activities simultaneously. An activity was recorded as long as it was proved to have happened by a press release, fact sheet or news article. The project or activity must be bilateral in nature as opposed to one-sided such as an agricultural report on Chinese soybeans or multi-lateral such as the Six-Party Talks. Some of these activities occurred both in China and in the United States, such as the Strategic and Economic Dialogue which switched locations each year. If a project was ongoing, such as the Labor Law Cooperation Program that lasted from 2002-2007, it was counted once per year as a project. Figure 7a shows the total number of projects and activities that each department had in China and Figure 7b shows each department’s contribution to the total number of projects and activities as a percentage. The Defense Department has the largest sum of projects and activities in China with 33 out of a total of 219, which includes military-to-military relations and exercises, community relations projects with local Chinese civilian centers, and even joint concerts for American and Chinese military bands. It appears that the Defense Department has been conducting similar activities throughout 2002-2012, and from 2008 onwards these activities increased in frequency. The Justice Department has zero projects and activities with China, which can be explained by its emphasis on domestic crime issues rather than international issues. It is also interesting to note that seven of the departments all take up anywhere from 10-15% of the total number of projects and activities, suggesting that these interactions are not strongly concentrated in one particular department and supports the notion that there is a common desire to engage China among the departments. However, this chart includes both unilateral and multi-lateral activities among the agencies and cannot be used to determine widespread cooperation. Figure 8 shows the total number of projects and activities all of the departments have conducted for each year. Apart from the slight drop in 2009 and the plateau from 2011 to 2012, the number of activities has generally increased by more than twice as much relative to 2002. It is possible that the deviation in 2009 is due to Obama’s taking office and the subsequent shuffling of his cabinet, which may have caused the drop in activities. Compared to the previous categories, the projects and activities category has the most visible trend of increase relative to the beginning of the temporal domain. And in conjunction with the relatively even spread of interactions among the departments, this is also the strongest case for a general increase in US relations with China. These projects and activities are probably more effective in portraying US interactions with China than the official travels category because these activities occurred in both China and in the US. With the second category, there can only be so many agreements made in specific policy areas that have not already been addressed, but with activities such as annual forums and dialogues they are more likely to continue consistently unless there is a period of time where US-China relations significantly decline. And thirdly, because the creation and offices and posts have not been measured over time the two categories cannot be compared in terms of yearly development, but both serve to show how widespread both sets of US-China interactions are. Joint Programs The fifth and last category I examined involved the recording of joint programs, or programs that included more than one agency interacting with China. This category was not intended to measure development over time, but instead to investigate whether the departments were more likely to work together in their activities with China or prefer unilateral interactions. These programs can include projects, forums, meetings, and community relations activities, much like the previous category. The use of the word “programs” is not used exclusively, and is interchangeable with “activities” for the purposes of this study. These were already recorded under the projects and activities category, but they have been placed in another category for the purpose of examining to what extent the departments are willing to cooperate in joint projects with one another. Examining the number of joint programs is important because it shows to what extent agencies are willing to participate in multi-agency projects as opposed to single agency ones. One such example is the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, an annual meeting in which multiple American agencies meet with their Chinese counterparts in a high level bilateral forum that allows American and Chinese leaders to discuss broad policy issues that deal with both international and domestic concerns in order to promote mutual interests. In this study there were no joint community relations activities. In order for the results of this category to be significant with regards to a general trend in department cooperation, more than half of the total projects and activities should be joint programs. Figure 9a shows the total number of joint programs that each department has participated in from 2002-2012, as well as the actual number of joint programs that were recorded, which was eight. Figure 9b shows the contribution each department has in total participation in joint programs as a percentage. The data shows that the Commerce Department has participated in the most joint programs, and that the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security and Justice have not participated in any joint programs. The Commerce Department’s participation in the Environmental Industries Forum is joined by the Environmental Protection Agency, which is not listed in this study because it is not a cabinet-level agency. The spread of participation is less evenly distributed than the projects and activities category, and the concentration in the Commerce and State Departments suggests that those two departments are more likely to participate in joint programs than the others. Their greater participation also suggests their willingness to engage China in a more cooperative manner with other departments. Interestingly, the Commerce Department is more often the head of these joint programs than the State Department is, such as its leadership in the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, the Oil and Gas Industry Forum, the Environmental Industries Forum, and the Innovation Conferences of 2007 and 2010. However, the Treasury Department has taken the leadership position for the joint programs with the most number of participating agencies, such as the Strategic Economic Dialogue, the Strategic and Economic Dialogue and the Ten Year Energy and Environment Cooperation Framework. The only State Department initiated program that was recorded was Hillary Clinton’s 100,000 Strong Initiative, in which the Education Department is mentioned a participant. The rest of the State Department’s participation in joint programs is related to strategic and diplomatic purposes rather than economic like the Treasury or Commerce Departments, but the State Department is not publicly listed as taking a leadership or chairmanship position in these programs. In comparison to the fourth category of overall projects and activities, the joint programs category appears to show that departments have a preference towards single agency programs rather than multi-agency programs. Considering that there were only 49 joint activities among the 219 various projects and activities that the departments participated in during 2002-2012, there does not seem to be a united nor concentrated movement towards interacting with China. This lack of joint programs might be explained by the difficulty of planning multi-agency activities with China, given that many of the departments focus on diverse policy areas and may have no interest in a joint program. For instance, apart from the Strategic Economic Dialogue and the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the Health and Human Services Department focuses largely on health-specific projects and issues, and it does not share any joint programs with other departments most likely because of its health policy specialization. Based on the amount of participation in joint programs that was recorded, there does not appear to be a trend of multi-agency cooperation in US department relations with China. Conclusion This project investigated the development of US-China relations at the department level over the course of 2002 to 2012. I researched five separate categories of departmental activities, including official travels to China, signed agreements made with Chinese officials, permanent offices and posts in China, projects and activities, and finally joint programs among multiple agencies. For official travels, there was a strong concentration of total travels in the State Department. Additionally, while there was a visible increase in the quantity of travels taken by US departments to China, the amount of visits varied greatly and lacked consistency. It is unclear if these travels are to increase in the future. Regarding signed agreements, there was a high concentration in the Energy, Agriculture and Commerce Departments. Much like the official travels, while there was an overall increase in the number of signed agreements, there was a lack of a consistent trend, particularly as the number declined after the peak in 2009. In terms of permanent posts and offices, most of them were concentrated in the Commerce, State and Agriculture Departments. There was also a high concentration of posts in Beijing, which is unsurprising given that it is the nation’s capital. But it was also interesting to find that more than half of the offices were located outside of Beijing and spread throughout the country. For projects and activities undertaken in or with China, the activities were more evenly distributed among the departments and there was a more visibly consistent trend of increase compared to other categories. And for joint programs among multiple agencies, there were much fewer instances of cooperative activities among the agencies compared to the overall scope of projects and activities, suggesting that the departments do not have a preference towards cooperation and instead prefer unilateral actions. Through these results, the only clear increasing trend lies with projects and activities undertaken by the departments, albeit independently of each other. However the results as a whole do imply that over the course of 2002-2012, there has been an overall increase in the amount of activities taken with China, even if the amount per year has not been in a consistent pattern. Based on this project it seems that cabinet-level departments are more likely to be independent in their activities but overall those that do have activities with China are increasing their interactions in comparison to 2002, which emphasizes the growing importance of China to American foreign policy.
Teddy Hsieh
PS 191D
Prof. Tong
1 June 2013
US Federal Agencies and China
The Research Project
China’s rise as a new power has prompted many questions about how America should approach it in the 21st century. China has recently become the world’s 2nd largest economy in terms of Gross Domestic Product (PPP) as well as the world’s largest trading economy, and the US has taken several steps to engage a rising China to ensure amiable bilateral relations as well as China’s cooperation within the international community. While many scholars are interested in America’s national response to China’s rise, none have investigated the US’s response at the federal department and agency level. This research project compared the responses of US Federal Government Departments to the rise of China, which includes all Cabinet level agencies and their relevant sub-agencies. Specifically, the project examines these questions:
1) What US federal government agencies have China related activities?
2) What do these activities entail?
3) What has been the development of these interactions with China in the past 10 years (2002-2012)?
This topic is intended to show what the American government specifically does in its relations with China at the federal level, and to investigate to what extent the departments have worked in a multi-agency cooperative effort to interact with China or if they have preferred unilateral approaches instead. And while the general public tends to perceive US-China relations as simply dialogues between leaders, this research allows for the examination of how foreign policy is created and implemented by individual governmental units through specific acts of engagement.
Temporal-Spatial Domain
For this project I conducted my research within the time frame of 2002-2012, particularly because many of the departments and agencies I investigated have only begun extensive interactions with China in the last 10 years. The study focused entirely on American departments at the federal level interacting in China, which includes official travels to China, signed agreements, permanent presence in China, cooperative projects or meetings with Chinese government officials or joint programs with other agencies in China.
Departments are defined as government bodies in the executive branch that are authorized by Congress, each headed by a Secretary that advises the US president in his Cabinet and generally handle large policy issues. Executive agencies are more specifically designed to implement tasks, most of which are created and managed by the departments. Because of this, activities conducted by agencies on behalf of their respective departments will be considered department actions. The project investigated all 15 cabinet-level departments at the national level and their relevant sub-agencies to see which governmental bodies meet the criteria of having China-related activities.
The US Departments include:
Agriculture
Commerce
Defense
Education
Energy
Health and Human Services
Homeland Security
Justice
Labor
State
Transportation
Treasury
Methods and Data Sources
In order to collect the information I needed regarding the activities of federal departments in China, I explored several kinds of websites as my sources, recording what I found on Excel spreadsheets. See Appendices for the results of this investigation.
The primary type of website I used was the official government websites of each department, taking several steps to thoroughly search for information. For example, for the State Department I used www.state.gov, and the first section I would look for is any label related to official travel by the department’s top leaders. If the website did not contain a “travel” section on their website, I would look into the press releases and fact sheets archives for evidence if travels occurred at all. I also looked for sections related to offices or posts in China, such as links for the US embassy or another overseas office. I would also look for possible sub-agency tabs related to international affairs or foreign affairs that specifically addressed China; in the case of the State Department, this was the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Within their news archives, if possible I would set the search parameters to January 1st to December 31st of each year and search using the words “China”, “China relations”, and “China visit” in order to better organize the results by year. Next, I would look through the titles of each of the resulting publications and read through each article to determine if any of the publications met my criteria for Chinese-related activities.
No website was perfect in their arrangement and design, nor were the publications completely extensive. For instance, the Treasury and Defense Departments’ websites were very well designed in making information easily accessible, with specific tabs and parameters that could be used to narrow searches. However, sometimes there were incomplete sections, where only one year was publicly listed and the information from other years would have to be found through archive searches. Other websites simply lacked search parameters and I had to look through all of the documents relating to or containing the word “China” in order to find where 2002 began. There were also several occasions when the link for the article simply did not work because the file was either corrupted or no longer existed in the system. In terms of inconsistencies, articles for some annual programs such as the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade were available for some years but missing for others.
In order to fulfill some of these inconsistencies or missing proof of these events having taken place, I would use news websites that mentioned the missing event through Google searches to supplement the data I had already found. This was particularly helpful when a newspaper such as the Chinese People’s Daily Online provided an article featuring an event that the government websites had no information on. Otherwise American newspapers such as the New York Times also provided proof that these events happened.
The Data
Official Travels to China
The first category I searched for was official travels to China by each of the departments. Travels by government officials to China might involve visitations for annual forums, negotiations over bilateral issues, consultations for multilateral meetings such as the Six-Party Talks, or even for community relations. These visits are important because they not only convey the recognition of another country’s sovereignty, but they are also a tangible means of face-to-face diplomacy by which two countries can strengthen ties with one another.
For this study I counted every travel by any government official that was recorded in an official press release, publication or fact sheet from the archives of each government website. As long as there was an official article to prove that a visitation occurred, it was counted in this study. If it was clear that a visit should have occurred but there was no corresponding article, I would first search articles published after the visit to see if it was mentioned as a previous event. If not, then I would search news articles to see if they had any pertinent articles. Finally, if neither option were successful, I would count the visit anyway and make a note in my data if there was missing proof. In this category I expected that travels to China would increase over time as the American government became more involved in bilateral relations.
Figure 1a shows the total number of visits that each department made to China during the years 2002 to 2012, and Figure 1b represents what each department contributed to the overall number of visits as a percentage. Unsurprisingly, the State Department dwarfs the other departments with a total of 67 visits out of a combined 174 to China. This is an expected result because the State Department is designed to be the official foreign relations arm of the United States, advancing the nation’s interests through the implementation of US foreign policy and diplomacy with other countries. Naturally, this would require the State Department to be more active abroad than other departments, especially if it is primarily tasked with meeting with foreign leaders and representing US interests. What is surprising is that the Justice Department had travels to China at all, considering it only included two visits from two Attorney-Generals that encouraged future cooperation in law enforcement.
Figure 2 shows the total number of visits all the departments made to China per year. The year 2008 is demonstrably the period of the most visits to China, while 2004 was the period of the least amount of visits. The years of 2006-2008 show a rapid increase in visits, which was most likely caused by the occurrence of the Six-Party Talks during those years. The Six-Party Talks were a series of multi-lateral meetings in which the US, China, North Korea, Japan, South Korea and Russia met to discuss resolutions in the wake of North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. After the meetings were canceled by North Korea’s failed satellite launch in 2009, there is a noticeable drop in visits, but this is followed by another increasing trend during the years 2009-2011. This latter trend could possibly be explained by the increased involvement in cooperative forums such as the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, China’s rise as the second largest economy in the world as of 2010 and Obama’s subsequent Pivot Policy, as well as additional North Korean aggression in the Korean Peninsula in 2010. Another possible factor could be the shuffling of the presidential cabinet as Obama took office after the 2008 election. It may have taken his cabinet secretaries time to settle into their new positions and subsequently this may have delayed the new cabinet’s outreach to China.
Figure 2 does not present a clear pattern of China visits by federal departments. While the visits have been consistently greater than 10 visits after 2005, the amount of visits per year do not show a strong increase over the time period.
Agreements with China
The second category I searched for was bilateral agreements made between US Departments and Chinese government agencies. The agreements took the form of Memoranda of Understandings, Letters of Intent, Agreements, Guidelines, Letters of Understanding, etc. The purpose of these agreements is to create beneficial frameworks where both parties may have room to achieve mutual goals. Though they do not have legally binding powers, they are more flexible than contracts and are more formal than verbal agreements. These agreements are not considered to be at the level of treaties, and therefore do not need Senate approval through ratification. I chose to record signed agreements because they are publicly announced as seen in articles, are more accountable than verbal agreements, and there have been no formal bilateral treaties with China since the Mutual Defense Treaty with the pre-communist government. It is important to understand the occurrence of these agreements because it is a means by which the US and China can improve their relations with one another through cooperative measures.
For this study, any signed agreement titled in a similar manner to what was mentioned in the above paragraph was counted as long as there was a publication that proved the agreement occurred at all. On multiple occasions some department websites provided information on the agreements of other departments, such as the Treasury Department website showing an agreement made between the Transportation Department and its Chinese counterpart despite the Transportation Department’s lack of a relevant article in its own database.
Figure 3a shows the number of agreements that each department had with China in the course of 2002-2012, and Figure 3b shows the contribution of each department to the total amount of agreements as a percentage. It can be seen that the Energy Department has the most number of agreements made with China, followed by Agriculture and Commerce. The dominance of the Energy Department, with 42 out of 126 combined agreements, might be explained by America’s recent turn towards alternative energy sources, as stipulated by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. Moreover, as China began pursuing renewable energy sources with its Renewable Energy Law in 2006, it is no surprise that the US would seek to engage one of the largest polluters on Earth in addition to itself. The Defense, Homeland Security and Justice Departments all have the least amount of agreements. The Defense Department only has agreements regarding the investigation of past POW’s and still missing personnel from past wars, and it is unlikely that the armed forces of the two countries would be eligible to negotiate agreements besides minor issues dealing with history without the Defense Secretary or other upper echelon leaders. The Homeland Security Department is mostly concerned with US national security, and while cooperation with its Chinese counterpart may be beneficial, formalized agreements are probably unnecessary given the Department’s emphasis on the domestic sphere. Finally, the Justice Department is largely concerned with domestic crimes and infractions of the law, so agreements with their Chinese counterparts would be unlikely as well.
Figure 4 shows the total number of agreements made per year. There is a peak of agreements in the year 2009, but after that year there is a noticeable decrease in signed agreements, with 2012 having the least amount. For several of the departments, there is a surprising lack of data for the year 2012. For example, in the Agriculture Department there were generally more than two agreements per year, except 2012 which yields no data at all. It is also interesting to note that the three years before were consecutively increasing from two agreements to four agreements in 2011. Similarly, despite having four or more agreements in 2010 or 2011, the Commerce and Energy Departments also had significant drops to one or no agreements at all. One possible explanation for the decrease from 2009 to 2012 may be that US federal departments may have spent more time interacting with other countries as a result of Obama’s first term and the later introduction of his “Pivot” policy. Another explanation may be that the departments may have already addressed most policy areas of concern to both countries during the years prior to 2012, and thus there may have been no need for new agreements or the renewing of any agreements.
Though the number of agreements made per year beginning from 2002 was consistently greater than five until 2012, the data again presents no clear pattern of increase regarding departmental activity with China.
Offices and Posts
The third category I investigated focused on how many permanent offices or posts (if any) that the departments had in China. These overseas positions allow each agency to have a presence in China in order to monitor their specific policy areas as well as relations with their Chinese counterparts. For example, the Department of Agriculture has Agricultural Trade Offices in Beijing as well as in four other major cities in order to monitor and report on agricultural trade reports in different parts of China. Likewise, the Commerce Department’s Commercial Service has many regional offices throughout the country that provide custom regional support for US businesses to start and expand trade in China. The offices themselves are usually located within the US Embassy or Consulates in the major cities, sharing the building location with other agencies.
In order to determine if an agency had an overseas office or post, I searched each government website for its “office” section. If there was no such explicit section, I used the website’s search engine with “China office” to find the appropriate links. I did not record the years that the offices were established because some were founded in years not included in this study and some positions do not have date information. Like the agreements category, some websites provided multiple links for several different agency offices in one location, such as the US Embassy in Beijing website, which allowed me to record the offices of Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland Security, and Energy. Some posts such as the full-time epidemiologist for the Department of Health and Human Services were more obscure and were sometimes mentioned as a part of articles related to activities in China.
Figure 5 shows the number of offices or posts that each department has in China. The Commerce Department has the most offices with 20 out of a total of 49 offices, which highlights the importance of the economic relationship between the US and China. The Defense, Education, Labor, Transportation and Treasury Departments have no offices at all. The Defense Department does not have a permanent presence in China because that would amount to constructing a military base which would be considered a violation of China’s sovereignty. The other four departments probably do not have any offices because there is no need to monitor or report conditions related to their policy areas in China. The only office that the Energy Department has is located in Beijing. The Commerce Department has the most offices most likely because it is trying to maximize its coverage of China’s diverse industries throughout the country. In comparison to agriculture, trade is much more varied in scope than agricultural trade because the latter is more specific in its industry. The State Department’s Embassy and Consulates are located in major cities in order to help American citizens as well as facilitate travel and business for Chinese citizens wishing to conduct activity in the US, while their Virtual Presence Posts are in relatively minor cities.
Figure 6 shows the number of US offices and posts located in each Chinese city known to have them. It is reasonable that Beijing should have the most amount of offices as well as the most amount of departments involved given that it is China’s capital city. For the departments to have offices in major cities such as Guangzhou, Hong Kong, Shanghai and Shenyang is also reasonable because of their importance as major industrial, trade and technological centers. The rest of the cities listed with single offices are most likely a part of the Commerce Department’s desire to involve itself in as many trade centers as possible in order to support the expansion of US business in China.
While the data does not show a particular trend regarding the creation of new offices over time, it does show that these offices and posts are widespread throughout China and not solely concentrated in the capital and major cities. Greater involvement by American departments in Chinese cities through improved diplomatic and commercial ties may encourage increased numbers of permanent offices in the future, especially as the Commerce Department has already expanded to smaller cities.
Projects and Activities
The fourth category of this study examines the development of departmental projects and activities in China. This includes cooperative projects, forums, community relations, exchanges and dialogues. The purpose of these activities is to enhance cooperation and improve ties between the departments and their Chinese counterparts, as well as facilitate collaborative efforts to accomplish common interests. By recording the development of projects and activities of various departments over 2002-2012, I hoped to find evidence that the US government was becoming increasingly more involved with China. In researching this category, I was surprised to find that some departments had extensive community relations projects. For example, the Defense Department has sent Army bands to China to participate in joint concerts, Navy sailors to visit orphanages, middle schools and centers for the disabled and elderly, and Air Force medical technicians to help train their Chinese counterparts.
For this category I searched press release and fact sheet archives and newspaper archives if necessary, with most of the pertinent documents the same as the ones used for the official travels section. This was helpful because each of these documents explained why the department official was visiting China, allowing me to record and track their travels and activities simultaneously. An activity was recorded as long as it was proved to have happened by a press release, fact sheet or news article. The project or activity must be bilateral in nature as opposed to one-sided such as an agricultural report on Chinese soybeans or multi-lateral such as the Six-Party Talks. Some of these activities occurred both in China and in the United States, such as the Strategic and Economic Dialogue which switched locations each year. If a project was ongoing, such as the Labor Law Cooperation Program that lasted from 2002-2007, it was counted once per year as a project.
Figure 7a shows the total number of projects and activities that each department had in China and Figure 7b shows each department’s contribution to the total number of projects and activities as a percentage. The Defense Department has the largest sum of projects and activities in China with 33 out of a total of 219, which includes military-to-military relations and exercises, community relations projects with local Chinese civilian centers, and even joint concerts for American and Chinese military bands. It appears that the Defense Department has been conducting similar activities throughout 2002-2012, and from 2008 onwards these activities increased in frequency. The Justice Department has zero projects and activities with China, which can be explained by its emphasis on domestic crime issues rather than international issues. It is also interesting to note that seven of the departments all take up anywhere from 10-15% of the total number of projects and activities, suggesting that these interactions are not strongly concentrated in one particular department and supports the notion that there is a common desire to engage China among the departments. However, this chart includes both unilateral and multi-lateral activities among the agencies and cannot be used to determine widespread cooperation.
Figure 8 shows the total number of projects and activities all of the departments have conducted for each year. Apart from the slight drop in 2009 and the plateau from 2011 to 2012, the number of activities has generally increased by more than twice as much relative to 2002. It is possible that the deviation in 2009 is due to Obama’s taking office and the subsequent shuffling of his cabinet, which may have caused the drop in activities.
Compared to the previous categories, the projects and activities category has the most visible trend of increase relative to the beginning of the temporal domain. And in conjunction with the relatively even spread of interactions among the departments, this is also the strongest case for a general increase in US relations with China. These projects and activities are probably more effective in portraying US interactions with China than the official travels category because these activities occurred in both China and in the US. With the second category, there can only be so many agreements made in specific policy areas that have not already been addressed, but with activities such as annual forums and dialogues they are more likely to continue consistently unless there is a period of time where US-China relations significantly decline. And thirdly, because the creation and offices and posts have not been measured over time the two categories cannot be compared in terms of yearly development, but both serve to show how widespread both sets of US-China interactions are.
Joint Programs
The fifth and last category I examined involved the recording of joint programs, or programs that included more than one agency interacting with China. This category was not intended to measure development over time, but instead to investigate whether the departments were more likely to work together in their activities with China or prefer unilateral interactions. These programs can include projects, forums, meetings, and community relations activities, much like the previous category. The use of the word “programs” is not used exclusively, and is interchangeable with “activities” for the purposes of this study. These were already recorded under the projects and activities category, but they have been placed in another category for the purpose of examining to what extent the departments are willing to cooperate in joint projects with one another. Examining the number of joint programs is important because it shows to what extent agencies are willing to participate in multi-agency projects as opposed to single agency ones. One such example is the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, an annual meeting in which multiple American agencies meet with their Chinese counterparts in a high level bilateral forum that allows American and Chinese leaders to discuss broad policy issues that deal with both international and domestic concerns in order to promote mutual interests. In this study there were no joint community relations activities. In order for the results of this category to be significant with regards to a general trend in department cooperation, more than half of the total projects and activities should be joint programs.
Figure 9a shows the total number of joint programs that each department has participated in from 2002-2012, as well as the actual number of joint programs that were recorded, which was eight. Figure 9b shows the contribution each department has in total participation in joint programs as a percentage. The data shows that the Commerce Department has participated in the most joint programs, and that the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security and Justice have not participated in any joint programs. The Commerce Department’s participation in the Environmental Industries Forum is joined by the Environmental Protection Agency, which is not listed in this study because it is not a cabinet-level agency. The spread of participation is less evenly distributed than the projects and activities category, and the concentration in the Commerce and State Departments suggests that those two departments are more likely to participate in joint programs than the others. Their greater participation also suggests their willingness to engage China in a more cooperative manner with other departments. Interestingly, the Commerce Department is more often the head of these joint programs than the State Department is, such as its leadership in the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, the Oil and Gas Industry Forum, the Environmental Industries Forum, and the Innovation Conferences of 2007 and 2010. However, the Treasury Department has taken the leadership position for the joint programs with the most number of participating agencies, such as the Strategic Economic Dialogue, the Strategic and Economic Dialogue and the Ten Year Energy and Environment Cooperation Framework. The only State Department initiated program that was recorded was Hillary Clinton’s 100,000 Strong Initiative, in which the Education Department is mentioned a participant. The rest of the State Department’s participation in joint programs is related to strategic and diplomatic purposes rather than economic like the Treasury or Commerce Departments, but the State Department is not publicly listed as taking a leadership or chairmanship position in these programs.
In comparison to the fourth category of overall projects and activities, the joint programs category appears to show that departments have a preference towards single agency programs rather than multi-agency programs. Considering that there were only 49 joint activities among the 219 various projects and activities that the departments participated in during 2002-2012, there does not seem to be a united nor concentrated movement towards interacting with China. This lack of joint programs might be explained by the difficulty of planning multi-agency activities with China, given that many of the departments focus on diverse policy areas and may have no interest in a joint program. For instance, apart from the Strategic Economic Dialogue and the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the Health and Human Services Department focuses largely on health-specific projects and issues, and it does not share any joint programs with other departments most likely because of its health policy specialization. Based on the amount of participation in joint programs that was recorded, there does not appear to be a trend of multi-agency cooperation in US department relations with China.
Conclusion
This project investigated the development of US-China relations at the department level over the course of 2002 to 2012. I researched five separate categories of departmental activities, including official travels to China, signed agreements made with Chinese officials, permanent offices and posts in China, projects and activities, and finally joint programs among multiple agencies. For official travels, there was a strong concentration of total travels in the State Department. Additionally, while there was a visible increase in the quantity of travels taken by US departments to China, the amount of visits varied greatly and lacked consistency. It is unclear if these travels are to increase in the future. Regarding signed agreements, there was a high concentration in the Energy, Agriculture and Commerce Departments. Much like the official travels, while there was an overall increase in the number of signed agreements, there was a lack of a consistent trend, particularly as the number declined after the peak in 2009. In terms of permanent posts and offices, most of them were concentrated in the Commerce, State and Agriculture Departments. There was also a high concentration of posts in Beijing, which is unsurprising given that it is the nation’s capital. But it was also interesting to find that more than half of the offices were located outside of Beijing and spread throughout the country. For projects and activities undertaken in or with China, the activities were more evenly distributed among the departments and there was a more visibly consistent trend of increase compared to other categories. And for joint programs among multiple agencies, there were much fewer instances of cooperative activities among the agencies compared to the overall scope of projects and activities, suggesting that the departments do not have a preference towards cooperation and instead prefer unilateral actions. Through these results, the only clear increasing trend lies with projects and activities undertaken by the departments, albeit independently of each other. However the results as a whole do imply that over the course of 2002-2012, there has been an overall increase in the amount of activities taken with China, even if the amount per year has not been in a consistent pattern. Based on this project it seems that cabinet-level departments are more likely to be independent in their activities but overall those that do have activities with China are increasing their interactions in comparison to 2002, which emphasizes the growing importance of China to American foreign policy.
PS 191D
Prof. Tong
1 June 2013
US Federal Agencies and China
The Research Project
China’s rise as a new power has prompted many questions about how America should approach it in the 21st century. China has recently become the world’s 2nd largest economy in terms of Gross Domestic Product (PPP) as well as the world’s largest trading economy, and the US has taken several steps to engage a rising China to ensure amiable bilateral relations as well as China’s cooperation within the international community. While many scholars are interested in America’s national response to China’s rise, none have investigated the US’s response at the federal department and agency level. This research project compared the responses of US Federal Government Departments to the rise of China, which includes all Cabinet level agencies and their relevant sub-agencies. Specifically, the project examines these questions:
1) What US federal government agencies have China related activities?
2) What do these activities entail?
3) What has been the development of these interactions with China in the past 10 years (2002-2012)?
This topic is intended to show what the American government specifically does in its relations with China at the federal level, and to investigate to what extent the departments have worked in a multi-agency cooperative effort to interact with China or if they have preferred unilateral approaches instead. And while the general public tends to perceive US-China relations as simply dialogues between leaders, this research allows for the examination of how foreign policy is created and implemented by individual governmental units through specific acts of engagement.
Temporal-Spatial Domain
For this project I conducted my research within the time frame of 2002-2012, particularly because many of the departments and agencies I investigated have only begun extensive interactions with China in the last 10 years. The study focused entirely on American departments at the federal level interacting in China, which includes official travels to China, signed agreements, permanent presence in China, cooperative projects or meetings with Chinese government officials or joint programs with other agencies in China.
Departments are defined as government bodies in the executive branch that are authorized by Congress, each headed by a Secretary that advises the US president in his Cabinet and generally handle large policy issues. Executive agencies are more specifically designed to implement tasks, most of which are created and managed by the departments. Because of this, activities conducted by agencies on behalf of their respective departments will be considered department actions. The project investigated all 15 cabinet-level departments at the national level and their relevant sub-agencies to see which governmental bodies meet the criteria of having China-related activities.
The US Departments include:
Agriculture
Commerce
Defense
Education
Energy
Health and Human Services
Homeland Security
Justice
Labor
State
Transportation
Treasury
Methods and Data Sources
In order to collect the information I needed regarding the activities of federal departments in China, I explored several kinds of websites as my sources, recording what I found on Excel spreadsheets. See Appendices for the results of this investigation.
The primary type of website I used was the official government websites of each department, taking several steps to thoroughly search for information. For example, for the State Department I used www.state.gov, and the first section I would look for is any label related to official travel by the department’s top leaders. If the website did not contain a “travel” section on their website, I would look into the press releases and fact sheets archives for evidence if travels occurred at all. I also looked for sections related to offices or posts in China, such as links for the US embassy or another overseas office. I would also look for possible sub-agency tabs related to international affairs or foreign affairs that specifically addressed China; in the case of the State Department, this was the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Within their news archives, if possible I would set the search parameters to January 1st to December 31st of each year and search using the words “China”, “China relations”, and “China visit” in order to better organize the results by year. Next, I would look through the titles of each of the resulting publications and read through each article to determine if any of the publications met my criteria for Chinese-related activities.
No website was perfect in their arrangement and design, nor were the publications completely extensive. For instance, the Treasury and Defense Departments’ websites were very well designed in making information easily accessible, with specific tabs and parameters that could be used to narrow searches. However, sometimes there were incomplete sections, where only one year was publicly listed and the information from other years would have to be found through archive searches. Other websites simply lacked search parameters and I had to look through all of the documents relating to or containing the word “China” in order to find where 2002 began. There were also several occasions when the link for the article simply did not work because the file was either corrupted or no longer existed in the system. In terms of inconsistencies, articles for some annual programs such as the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade were available for some years but missing for others.
In order to fulfill some of these inconsistencies or missing proof of these events having taken place, I would use news websites that mentioned the missing event through Google searches to supplement the data I had already found. This was particularly helpful when a newspaper such as the Chinese People’s Daily Online provided an article featuring an event that the government websites had no information on. Otherwise American newspapers such as the New York Times also provided proof that these events happened.
The Data
Official Travels to China
The first category I searched for was official travels to China by each of the departments. Travels by government officials to China might involve visitations for annual forums, negotiations over bilateral issues, consultations for multilateral meetings such as the Six-Party Talks, or even for community relations. These visits are important because they not only convey the recognition of another country’s sovereignty, but they are also a tangible means of face-to-face diplomacy by which two countries can strengthen ties with one another.
For this study I counted every travel by any government official that was recorded in an official press release, publication or fact sheet from the archives of each government website. As long as there was an official article to prove that a visitation occurred, it was counted in this study. If it was clear that a visit should have occurred but there was no corresponding article, I would first search articles published after the visit to see if it was mentioned as a previous event. If not, then I would search news articles to see if they had any pertinent articles. Finally, if neither option were successful, I would count the visit anyway and make a note in my data if there was missing proof. In this category I expected that travels to China would increase over time as the American government became more involved in bilateral relations.
Figure 1a shows the total number of visits that each department made to China during the years 2002 to 2012, and Figure 1b represents what each department contributed to the overall number of visits as a percentage. Unsurprisingly, the State Department dwarfs the other departments with a total of 67 visits out of a combined 174 to China. This is an expected result because the State Department is designed to be the official foreign relations arm of the United States, advancing the nation’s interests through the implementation of US foreign policy and diplomacy with other countries. Naturally, this would require the State Department to be more active abroad than other departments, especially if it is primarily tasked with meeting with foreign leaders and representing US interests. What is surprising is that the Justice Department had travels to China at all, considering it only included two visits from two Attorney-Generals that encouraged future cooperation in law enforcement.
Figure 2 shows the total number of visits all the departments made to China per year. The year 2008 is demonstrably the period of the most visits to China, while 2004 was the period of the least amount of visits. The years of 2006-2008 show a rapid increase in visits, which was most likely caused by the occurrence of the Six-Party Talks during those years. The Six-Party Talks were a series of multi-lateral meetings in which the US, China, North Korea, Japan, South Korea and Russia met to discuss resolutions in the wake of North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. After the meetings were canceled by North Korea’s failed satellite launch in 2009, there is a noticeable drop in visits, but this is followed by another increasing trend during the years 2009-2011. This latter trend could possibly be explained by the increased involvement in cooperative forums such as the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, China’s rise as the second largest economy in the world as of 2010 and Obama’s subsequent Pivot Policy, as well as additional North Korean aggression in the Korean Peninsula in 2010. Another possible factor could be the shuffling of the presidential cabinet as Obama took office after the 2008 election. It may have taken his cabinet secretaries time to settle into their new positions and subsequently this may have delayed the new cabinet’s outreach to China.
Figure 2 does not present a clear pattern of China visits by federal departments. While the visits have been consistently greater than 10 visits after 2005, the amount of visits per year do not show a strong increase over the time period.
Agreements with China
The second category I searched for was bilateral agreements made between US Departments and Chinese government agencies. The agreements took the form of Memoranda of Understandings, Letters of Intent, Agreements, Guidelines, Letters of Understanding, etc. The purpose of these agreements is to create beneficial frameworks where both parties may have room to achieve mutual goals. Though they do not have legally binding powers, they are more flexible than contracts and are more formal than verbal agreements. These agreements are not considered to be at the level of treaties, and therefore do not need Senate approval through ratification. I chose to record signed agreements because they are publicly announced as seen in articles, are more accountable than verbal agreements, and there have been no formal bilateral treaties with China since the Mutual Defense Treaty with the pre-communist government. It is important to understand the occurrence of these agreements because it is a means by which the US and China can improve their relations with one another through cooperative measures.
For this study, any signed agreement titled in a similar manner to what was mentioned in the above paragraph was counted as long as there was a publication that proved the agreement occurred at all. On multiple occasions some department websites provided information on the agreements of other departments, such as the Treasury Department website showing an agreement made between the Transportation Department and its Chinese counterpart despite the Transportation Department’s lack of a relevant article in its own database.
Figure 3a shows the number of agreements that each department had with China in the course of 2002-2012, and Figure 3b shows the contribution of each department to the total amount of agreements as a percentage. It can be seen that the Energy Department has the most number of agreements made with China, followed by Agriculture and Commerce. The dominance of the Energy Department, with 42 out of 126 combined agreements, might be explained by America’s recent turn towards alternative energy sources, as stipulated by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. Moreover, as China began pursuing renewable energy sources with its Renewable Energy Law in 2006, it is no surprise that the US would seek to engage one of the largest polluters on Earth in addition to itself. The Defense, Homeland Security and Justice Departments all have the least amount of agreements. The Defense Department only has agreements regarding the investigation of past POW’s and still missing personnel from past wars, and it is unlikely that the armed forces of the two countries would be eligible to negotiate agreements besides minor issues dealing with history without the Defense Secretary or other upper echelon leaders. The Homeland Security Department is mostly concerned with US national security, and while cooperation with its Chinese counterpart may be beneficial, formalized agreements are probably unnecessary given the Department’s emphasis on the domestic sphere. Finally, the Justice Department is largely concerned with domestic crimes and infractions of the law, so agreements with their Chinese counterparts would be unlikely as well.
Figure 4 shows the total number of agreements made per year. There is a peak of agreements in the year 2009, but after that year there is a noticeable decrease in signed agreements, with 2012 having the least amount. For several of the departments, there is a surprising lack of data for the year 2012. For example, in the Agriculture Department there were generally more than two agreements per year, except 2012 which yields no data at all. It is also interesting to note that the three years before were consecutively increasing from two agreements to four agreements in 2011. Similarly, despite having four or more agreements in 2010 or 2011, the Commerce and Energy Departments also had significant drops to one or no agreements at all. One possible explanation for the decrease from 2009 to 2012 may be that US federal departments may have spent more time interacting with other countries as a result of Obama’s first term and the later introduction of his “Pivot” policy. Another explanation may be that the departments may have already addressed most policy areas of concern to both countries during the years prior to 2012, and thus there may have been no need for new agreements or the renewing of any agreements.
Though the number of agreements made per year beginning from 2002 was consistently greater than five until 2012, the data again presents no clear pattern of increase regarding departmental activity with China.
Offices and Posts
The third category I investigated focused on how many permanent offices or posts (if any) that the departments had in China. These overseas positions allow each agency to have a presence in China in order to monitor their specific policy areas as well as relations with their Chinese counterparts. For example, the Department of Agriculture has Agricultural Trade Offices in Beijing as well as in four other major cities in order to monitor and report on agricultural trade reports in different parts of China. Likewise, the Commerce Department’s Commercial Service has many regional offices throughout the country that provide custom regional support for US businesses to start and expand trade in China. The offices themselves are usually located within the US Embassy or Consulates in the major cities, sharing the building location with other agencies.
In order to determine if an agency had an overseas office or post, I searched each government website for its “office” section. If there was no such explicit section, I used the website’s search engine with “China office” to find the appropriate links. I did not record the years that the offices were established because some were founded in years not included in this study and some positions do not have date information. Like the agreements category, some websites provided multiple links for several different agency offices in one location, such as the US Embassy in Beijing website, which allowed me to record the offices of Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland Security, and Energy. Some posts such as the full-time epidemiologist for the Department of Health and Human Services were more obscure and were sometimes mentioned as a part of articles related to activities in China.
Figure 5 shows the number of offices or posts that each department has in China. The Commerce Department has the most offices with 20 out of a total of 49 offices, which highlights the importance of the economic relationship between the US and China. The Defense, Education, Labor, Transportation and Treasury Departments have no offices at all. The Defense Department does not have a permanent presence in China because that would amount to constructing a military base which would be considered a violation of China’s sovereignty. The other four departments probably do not have any offices because there is no need to monitor or report conditions related to their policy areas in China. The only office that the Energy Department has is located in Beijing. The Commerce Department has the most offices most likely because it is trying to maximize its coverage of China’s diverse industries throughout the country. In comparison to agriculture, trade is much more varied in scope than agricultural trade because the latter is more specific in its industry. The State Department’s Embassy and Consulates are located in major cities in order to help American citizens as well as facilitate travel and business for Chinese citizens wishing to conduct activity in the US, while their Virtual Presence Posts are in relatively minor cities.
Figure 6 shows the number of US offices and posts located in each Chinese city known to have them. It is reasonable that Beijing should have the most amount of offices as well as the most amount of departments involved given that it is China’s capital city. For the departments to have offices in major cities such as Guangzhou, Hong Kong, Shanghai and Shenyang is also reasonable because of their importance as major industrial, trade and technological centers. The rest of the cities listed with single offices are most likely a part of the Commerce Department’s desire to involve itself in as many trade centers as possible in order to support the expansion of US business in China.
While the data does not show a particular trend regarding the creation of new offices over time, it does show that these offices and posts are widespread throughout China and not solely concentrated in the capital and major cities. Greater involvement by American departments in Chinese cities through improved diplomatic and commercial ties may encourage increased numbers of permanent offices in the future, especially as the Commerce Department has already expanded to smaller cities.
Projects and Activities
The fourth category of this study examines the development of departmental projects and activities in China. This includes cooperative projects, forums, community relations, exchanges and dialogues. The purpose of these activities is to enhance cooperation and improve ties between the departments and their Chinese counterparts, as well as facilitate collaborative efforts to accomplish common interests. By recording the development of projects and activities of various departments over 2002-2012, I hoped to find evidence that the US government was becoming increasingly more involved with China. In researching this category, I was surprised to find that some departments had extensive community relations projects. For example, the Defense Department has sent Army bands to China to participate in joint concerts, Navy sailors to visit orphanages, middle schools and centers for the disabled and elderly, and Air Force medical technicians to help train their Chinese counterparts.
For this category I searched press release and fact sheet archives and newspaper archives if necessary, with most of the pertinent documents the same as the ones used for the official travels section. This was helpful because each of these documents explained why the department official was visiting China, allowing me to record and track their travels and activities simultaneously. An activity was recorded as long as it was proved to have happened by a press release, fact sheet or news article. The project or activity must be bilateral in nature as opposed to one-sided such as an agricultural report on Chinese soybeans or multi-lateral such as the Six-Party Talks. Some of these activities occurred both in China and in the United States, such as the Strategic and Economic Dialogue which switched locations each year. If a project was ongoing, such as the Labor Law Cooperation Program that lasted from 2002-2007, it was counted once per year as a project.
Figure 7a shows the total number of projects and activities that each department had in China and Figure 7b shows each department’s contribution to the total number of projects and activities as a percentage. The Defense Department has the largest sum of projects and activities in China with 33 out of a total of 219, which includes military-to-military relations and exercises, community relations projects with local Chinese civilian centers, and even joint concerts for American and Chinese military bands. It appears that the Defense Department has been conducting similar activities throughout 2002-2012, and from 2008 onwards these activities increased in frequency. The Justice Department has zero projects and activities with China, which can be explained by its emphasis on domestic crime issues rather than international issues. It is also interesting to note that seven of the departments all take up anywhere from 10-15% of the total number of projects and activities, suggesting that these interactions are not strongly concentrated in one particular department and supports the notion that there is a common desire to engage China among the departments. However, this chart includes both unilateral and multi-lateral activities among the agencies and cannot be used to determine widespread cooperation.
Figure 8 shows the total number of projects and activities all of the departments have conducted for each year. Apart from the slight drop in 2009 and the plateau from 2011 to 2012, the number of activities has generally increased by more than twice as much relative to 2002. It is possible that the deviation in 2009 is due to Obama’s taking office and the subsequent shuffling of his cabinet, which may have caused the drop in activities.
Compared to the previous categories, the projects and activities category has the most visible trend of increase relative to the beginning of the temporal domain. And in conjunction with the relatively even spread of interactions among the departments, this is also the strongest case for a general increase in US relations with China. These projects and activities are probably more effective in portraying US interactions with China than the official travels category because these activities occurred in both China and in the US. With the second category, there can only be so many agreements made in specific policy areas that have not already been addressed, but with activities such as annual forums and dialogues they are more likely to continue consistently unless there is a period of time where US-China relations significantly decline. And thirdly, because the creation and offices and posts have not been measured over time the two categories cannot be compared in terms of yearly development, but both serve to show how widespread both sets of US-China interactions are.
Joint Programs
The fifth and last category I examined involved the recording of joint programs, or programs that included more than one agency interacting with China. This category was not intended to measure development over time, but instead to investigate whether the departments were more likely to work together in their activities with China or prefer unilateral interactions. These programs can include projects, forums, meetings, and community relations activities, much like the previous category. The use of the word “programs” is not used exclusively, and is interchangeable with “activities” for the purposes of this study. These were already recorded under the projects and activities category, but they have been placed in another category for the purpose of examining to what extent the departments are willing to cooperate in joint projects with one another. Examining the number of joint programs is important because it shows to what extent agencies are willing to participate in multi-agency projects as opposed to single agency ones. One such example is the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, an annual meeting in which multiple American agencies meet with their Chinese counterparts in a high level bilateral forum that allows American and Chinese leaders to discuss broad policy issues that deal with both international and domestic concerns in order to promote mutual interests. In this study there were no joint community relations activities. In order for the results of this category to be significant with regards to a general trend in department cooperation, more than half of the total projects and activities should be joint programs.
Figure 9a shows the total number of joint programs that each department has participated in from 2002-2012, as well as the actual number of joint programs that were recorded, which was eight. Figure 9b shows the contribution each department has in total participation in joint programs as a percentage. The data shows that the Commerce Department has participated in the most joint programs, and that the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security and Justice have not participated in any joint programs. The Commerce Department’s participation in the Environmental Industries Forum is joined by the Environmental Protection Agency, which is not listed in this study because it is not a cabinet-level agency. The spread of participation is less evenly distributed than the projects and activities category, and the concentration in the Commerce and State Departments suggests that those two departments are more likely to participate in joint programs than the others. Their greater participation also suggests their willingness to engage China in a more cooperative manner with other departments. Interestingly, the Commerce Department is more often the head of these joint programs than the State Department is, such as its leadership in the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, the Oil and Gas Industry Forum, the Environmental Industries Forum, and the Innovation Conferences of 2007 and 2010. However, the Treasury Department has taken the leadership position for the joint programs with the most number of participating agencies, such as the Strategic Economic Dialogue, the Strategic and Economic Dialogue and the Ten Year Energy and Environment Cooperation Framework. The only State Department initiated program that was recorded was Hillary Clinton’s 100,000 Strong Initiative, in which the Education Department is mentioned a participant. The rest of the State Department’s participation in joint programs is related to strategic and diplomatic purposes rather than economic like the Treasury or Commerce Departments, but the State Department is not publicly listed as taking a leadership or chairmanship position in these programs.
In comparison to the fourth category of overall projects and activities, the joint programs category appears to show that departments have a preference towards single agency programs rather than multi-agency programs. Considering that there were only 49 joint activities among the 219 various projects and activities that the departments participated in during 2002-2012, there does not seem to be a united nor concentrated movement towards interacting with China. This lack of joint programs might be explained by the difficulty of planning multi-agency activities with China, given that many of the departments focus on diverse policy areas and may have no interest in a joint program. For instance, apart from the Strategic Economic Dialogue and the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the Health and Human Services Department focuses largely on health-specific projects and issues, and it does not share any joint programs with other departments most likely because of its health policy specialization. Based on the amount of participation in joint programs that was recorded, there does not appear to be a trend of multi-agency cooperation in US department relations with China.
Conclusion
This project investigated the development of US-China relations at the department level over the course of 2002 to 2012. I researched five separate categories of departmental activities, including official travels to China, signed agreements made with Chinese officials, permanent offices and posts in China, projects and activities, and finally joint programs among multiple agencies. For official travels, there was a strong concentration of total travels in the State Department. Additionally, while there was a visible increase in the quantity of travels taken by US departments to China, the amount of visits varied greatly and lacked consistency. It is unclear if these travels are to increase in the future. Regarding signed agreements, there was a high concentration in the Energy, Agriculture and Commerce Departments. Much like the official travels, while there was an overall increase in the number of signed agreements, there was a lack of a consistent trend, particularly as the number declined after the peak in 2009. In terms of permanent posts and offices, most of them were concentrated in the Commerce, State and Agriculture Departments. There was also a high concentration of posts in Beijing, which is unsurprising given that it is the nation’s capital. But it was also interesting to find that more than half of the offices were located outside of Beijing and spread throughout the country. For projects and activities undertaken in or with China, the activities were more evenly distributed among the departments and there was a more visibly consistent trend of increase compared to other categories. And for joint programs among multiple agencies, there were much fewer instances of cooperative activities among the agencies compared to the overall scope of projects and activities, suggesting that the departments do not have a preference towards cooperation and instead prefer unilateral actions. Through these results, the only clear increasing trend lies with projects and activities undertaken by the departments, albeit independently of each other. However the results as a whole do imply that over the course of 2002-2012, there has been an overall increase in the amount of activities taken with China, even if the amount per year has not been in a consistent pattern. Based on this project it seems that cabinet-level departments are more likely to be independent in their activities but overall those that do have activities with China are increasing their interactions in comparison to 2002, which emphasizes the growing importance of China to American foreign policy.
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